

Poverty Observatory in Mozambique:

Phase 2 of the Study: Interviews, Meetings and Additional Material

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ABBREVIATIONS

ADEL	Local Development Agency
AIMO	Mozambican Industrial Association
AMAZ	Water Consumers Association
ASA	Open Society Association
BdPES	Balanço do PES (Balance of Economic and Social Programme)
CCM	Mozambican Christian Council
CIP	Center for Public Integrity
CS	Civil Society
CSOs	Civil Society Organizations
CTA	Confederantionof Mozambican Economics Associations
DFID	UNK Department for International Development
DNPO	National Division for Planning and Budgeting
DPPF	Provincial Directorate of Planning and Finance
FDC	Foundation for Community Development
FOPROZA	Provincial Forum of NGOs in Beira
G20	Group of Civil Society Organizations
GMD	Grupo Moçambicano da Dívida (Mozambican Debt Group)
GoM	Government of Mozambique
HIPC	Heavily Indebted Poor Country
IAF	Household Survey (Inquerito de Agregados Familiares)
IMF	International Monetary Fund

INE	National Statistics Institute
MF	Ministry of Finance
MPD	Ministry of Planning and Finance
MPF	Ministry of Planning and Finance
NGOs	Non-Government Organizations
OE	Orçamento do Estado (State Budget)
Okhalihana	Forum of Civil Society in Nampula
PAP	Programme Aid Partnership
PARPA	Action Plan for the Reduction of Absolute Poverty
PES	Plano Económico e Social (Economic and Social Plan)
PO	Poverty Observatory
RAP	Relatorio Annual da Pobreza (Annual Poverty Report, prepared by G20)
SDC	Swiss Development Cooperation
SNV	Netherlands Development Organization
UCODIN	Unit for Integrated Development Coordination in Nampula
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
WB	World Bank

1. Summary Report

As part of the knowledge partnership on “Social Accountability for Poverty Reduction Strategies” between the World Bank and the Swiss Development Cooperation (SDC), a series of case studies will be documented. One of the case-studies selected is the so-called Poverty Observatory in Mozambique.

This document follows the first deliveries presented in January 2007 comprising a review of relevant secondary literature on the case study, a preliminary stakeholders’ analysis of the Poverty Observatory, mapping the key actors in Government (national and local) civil society, bilateral and multilateral actors. The report on Phase 1 of this study also outlined the issues to be dealt with, in the second phase of the PO study, and the methodology and draft questionnaire for interviews on the PO.

The main tasks set up by the Terms of Reference (ToR) for Phase 2 included conducting interviews with key stakeholder, a number of them jointly by the local and the international consultant, prepare a summary report of interviews, review summary report with international consultant, World Bank and SDC, and incorporate suggestions into a revised summary report.

At the beginning of Phase 2, after assessing the time and resources available, the consultants concluded that a target of about 20 to 25 interviews could be aimed for, with the objective to fulfil the objectives of the study as far as primary and updated information on the Poverty Observatory in Mozambique is concerned.

Section 2 of this report provides briefing on the methodology used during the interview process. Before that, though, it may be useful to advance a few clarifications in relation to the present document. Firstly, immediately after the interviews the consultants considered the possibility to merge the content of this report with the outline recommended in the ToR for the final report. Undoubtedly, that option would speed up the process leading to the final report of this case study.

However, after a careful consideration of the primary information gathered during the interviewing process, it became apparent that merging the summary report of interviews with the final report would entail a twofold disadvantage.

On the one hand, with regard to those who kindly responded to the request for being interviewed or met, a summarized and mere interpretative report on what they said would do no justice to the time and consideration they had given to our request. As this report shows, besides the content of the interviews themselves, several interviewees complemented their personal responses and statements with valuable supporting material. So, the value of several interviews goes far beyond what they stated orally, within the period of time the interview lasted. Whenever possible, following each interview the consultant tried to follow up and pick up the material considered relevant, cross-check some of the remarks, in subsequent interviews, or try to get a printed or electronic copy of relevant information.

On the other hand, with regard to the client and reader likely to be interested in this case study, much would be missed out if the consultant opted to provide just an interpretative summary report, with a list of the names of people interviewed/met at the end. Indeed, this is a very common and widely accepted method, used for very good reasons; for instance, the need to be parsimonious, concise and straightforward.

But there is another side to those good reasons. In some cases, not allowing the reader to have a more direct access to the contents of interviews the consultants undertook, can do more harm than good to the understanding of the matter under consideration. There are cases, in which there is simply no good excuse to prevent readers from a closer access to the content of interviews they had not the opportunity to conduct themselves.

Based on the above two reasons, the present summary report has been prepared to stand on its own, as a key delivery aiming at informing the case study with primary information drawn both from the oral interviews and the additional material gathered in the process of interviews.

Following a brief remark on the methodology, in section 2, the report is organized as follows: Section 3 contains information on how the PO has been described, in the official discourse, including its objectives, composition, structure and organization and its main financial supporter.

Section 4 comprises the main messages and points from the interviews and meetings undertaken. Through the interviews, additional information is included, depending on its relevance and availability.

Section 5 presents factual information and testimonial details, intended to allow readers to follow how a PO is actually prepared. Since the present study was conducted at the same time as the 6^o PO was expected to take place on the 26th March of 2007, it was possible to follow the progress of its preparation. This report will then include the step-by-step process of a PO preparation, between its announcement to the CS until the plenary session.

Annex 3 refers to the proceedings and material related to the Joint Review, which is intended to give an idea of the methodology and standards of such methodology. The Joint Review is organized in parallel to the PO, but in many respects they are closely related and could lead to more effective synergies.

In the final report this and other issues drawn from the interviews will be discussed further.

2. Methodology Used During the Interview Process

On the selection strategy of the interviewees, the main options were as follows:

1. The consultant started by taking into consideration the mapping provided in the first delivery, of the key actors in Government (national and local) civil society, bilateral and multilateral actors.
2. Based on the time and financial resources made available to the consultants, it was agreed to aim for about 20 to 25 interviews, drawn from relevant stakeholders, including but not limited to the Government, CSOs and main international cooperation partners.
3. In the end, the consultants managed to undertake 30 interviews, including almost 40 individuals. In some cases the interview involved two or even three people. Moreover, some independent observers or analysts, who have never been involved in past POs, were also included in the list of interviews. 17 interviews were conducted in Maputo City, 7 in Beira City and 6 in Nampula City.
4. Two thirds of the interviews were undertaken by the local consultant in the second half of February 2007, and the other one third was conducted together with the international consultant, in the first week of March 2007.
5. The interviews were semi-structured and focused on the set of questions outlined in the guidelines presented in the first delivery. These guidelines are once again recalled in the Annex 1 of this report.
6. From the onset there was no pretension to use the set of interviews as a representative sample of the whole universe, for which there is no clear idea as to the approximate number, particular with regard to the CSOs. Thus, rather than choosing the interviews at random, the 30 interviews were selected according to the main purposes of the study, namely: a) that interviews should involve some key people from the three major stakeholders (Government, Donors and CSOs) involved in the PO. With regard to the CSOs it was also agreed that some interviews could include analysts or researchers, independent or not directly involved in processes around the past POs.
7. Based on the above criteria then the interviewees have been chosen on a relatively flexible basis, in some cases depending on the availability of the potential interviewees and in others responding to the very recommendations from those who have been directly involved in the PO processes. This flexibility showed to be rather useful, particularly during the visits to Beira and Nampula. Once the interviews started, the consultants were often advised to contact one or another potential interviewee who could help in clarifying some specific matters.
8. The list of organizations/persons interviewed/met is contained in the Annex 2. The presentation of interviews in Section 4 does not follow the chronological order. Instead, the interviewees are arranged in five main groups: 1^o) Government entities directly involved in past POs; 2^o) CSOs directly involved in past POs; 3^o) International cooperation agencies; 4^o) Independent analysts and observers.

3. Description of the Poverty Observatory (PO) as it is portrayed officially


The following section contains a description of the PO, in the official discourse, including its objectives, composition and structure, organigram and main financial supporter. Then follow the main messages and points drawn from the interviews with some of the MPD's staff, including two who have in the past organized the POs.

Box 3.1: Poverty Observatory in Mozambique, 2003-2007
A MECHANISM FOR EVALUATING AND MONITORING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PARPA
<p>As part of the effort to evaluate and monitor the implementation of its current programme on poverty reduction popularly known as PARPA, the Government decided to set up the Poverty Observatory (PO). The PO is seen as a tool for both Government and its partners to follow-up the implementation of the PARPA, monitoring, evaluation and consultation processes envisaged within all actions intended for poverty reduction.</p> <p>In this respect the PO is a consultative forum for monitoring the objectives, targets and action that have been specifically assigned to public and private sector within the context of PARPA. As a consultative body, PO is expected to support the Government and its partners in the supervision and coordination, and draw on the combined energies of all stakeholders.</p> <p>On the 28 April 2003 the Government of Mozambique formally launched the forum of the Poverty Observatory and opened its first meeting. The meeting was opened by President Joachim Chissano. In his opening statement he spoke of the objectives of the PO as a forum for consultation between Government and development partners, internal and external. He spoke of the permanent status of the PO as a mechanism for interaction to address the problem of poverty. His address stressed the need to reduce poverty through socio-economic development as indicated in the programme of the government, PARPA.</p> <p>The first session of PO chaired by the Minister of Planning and Finance, was attended by most Ministers as well as representatives from all ministries. The Governor of the Central Bank, Provincial Governors, the private sector and representatives of the civil society were also present. The meeting also hosted 20 donors including 17 bilaterals, the World Bank, the IMF and UNDP.</p> <p>Most delegates recognized the government's continued commitment to poverty eradication, to the implementation of economic reforms and the PARPA. Delegates agreed that the key challenge confronting Mozambique was that of poverty and need for the poor to benefit from the growth and expansion in the economy. Thus, the implementation of PARPA was seen as a key strategy for sustaining poverty reducing growth.</p> <p>At the meeting, the Government presented the structure of the PO and its role as well as that of the required technical support from DNPO.</p>
Objectives of the Poverty Observatory
<p>Broadly speaking, the PO is intended to provide guidance to Government and to ensure transparent interaction between Government and partners involved in the fight against poverty.</p> <p>It is intended to have a permanent feature and to ensure that adequate data and information pertaining to the fight against poverty is effectively disseminated.</p> <p>The main objective is to monitor and evaluate the performance in the implementation of PARPA by collection of data on progress achieved and analyzing the data to better orient required action, conducting studies, research, meetings, seminars and establishing data banks, documenting experiences of best practices as well as publications. The PO will be expected to make suggestions to Government in order to promote the greatest impact of the implementation of the PARPA.</p>
Composition of the Poverty Observatory
<p>The PO is made up of two grouping from an ad hoc advisory group to be known as the Opinion Council and a permanent body known as the Technical Secretariat.</p> <p>The Opinion Council is made up of 60 members representing the central bodies of the State, civil society organizations, and from international development partners. More specifically, the breakdown is as follows, out of the 60 members, 24 are from selected government bodies and ministries, such as Planning and Finance, Health, Education, Agriculture, State Administration, Justice, the Central Bank, and the National Institute of Statistics, and the DNPO with its special position in the Technical Secretariat of the Poverty Observatory.</p> <p>The remaining 36 members are from civil society organizations, academic community, as well as religious organizations, trade unions, private business community, and international development partners.</p> <p>As part of the institutional responsibilities of the Ministry of Planning and Finance under the coordination of the preparation of</p>

the PARPA and other economic and inter-sectoral instruments, MPF will support the workings of the PO through a Technical Secretariat which is to establish within the DNPO.

PO Organigram

POVERTY OBSERVATORY IN MOZAMBIQUE ORGANIGRAM IN 2003-2007



MPD, 2006

Technical Secretariat

The Secretariat activities will be carried out by the DNPO which will ensure that it caters for all logistical needs of the PO. Other assignments include:

- Coordination of the work undertaken by relevant ministries in the implementation of the medium and short term planning instruments and support data and information collection and their analysis to ensure the smooth functioning of the PO;
- Collaborate with Government and non-governmental members in their support for PARPA.
- Propose research and studies on poverty and social development relevant to the work of the PO.
- Collect and disseminate examples of good practices in the fight against poverty.

UNDP, through a project titled "Support to PARPA's Monitoring and Evaluation System" will assist the Secretariat of the PO in the following activities:

- Capacity building of technical secretariat of the Poverty Observatory (OP) for poverty monitoring and MDGs performance tracking.
- establishment/strengthening of poverty monitoring information systems at provincial level;
- Poverty related strategic and impact evaluation studies.
- Nationwide sensitization and dissemination of PARPA and MDGs.
- revision and updating of PARPA with a focus on mainstreaming of cross-cutting issues (HIV/AIDS, Gender, ICT, demining and disaster prevention and management) in the PARPA and integration of the MDGs.

Sources: MPD, 2006; SARPN, 2006 <http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0000372/index.php>.

4. Primary Information on the Poverty Observatory

4.1. Government Entities Closely Involved In Past POs

 **Ministério da Planificação e Desenvolvimento** 

MPD

<http://www.mpd.gov.mz/>

<i>Links Relacionados:</i>	<i>Links Nacionais:</i>
Observatório da Pobreza	Portal do Governo Moçambique
Planificação Fin. Descentralizadas	Instituto Nacional de Estatística
	Banco de Moçambique

4.1.1. MPD & PO Secretariat

Meeting Cristina Matuse and Anifa Ibraimo, Maputo 25.01.2007

- The PO is the most important mechanism the Government can use to sit with main stakeholders. It has so far held five POs, the first in 2003, the second in 2004, the third and fourth in 2005, and fifth in 2006.
- What are the outputs coming from a PO? The POs have so far produced no resolution, or declaration on the main recommendations which should be closely followed by the main partners, in the period between one and another plenary PO. The POs focus on the PARPA, or the reports presented by the G20.
- The PO has no legal basis and no clear institutionalization. From the beginning it was launched as a Government's consultative mechanism. The initial motivation came from the World Bank request that PARPA should get the voice of the different stakeholders from the civil society.
- When the Government prepared the first PARPA there was no mechanism of consultation. The CS wanted also to be consulted and taken into consideration. In response to the different demands, both from the international cooperation organizations and the CSOs, the Government decided to set up an organized mechanism for consultation.
- The Government consults the CS but it is not obliged to follow what is recommended during the consultations. The last word is always up to the Government to decide. This is the reason we stress that the PO is just consultative.
- We admit that perhaps there is a need to move forward into a more involving and not just consulting process. One area is, for instance, the planning process, in which the CS should be more active.
- Some provinces are already trying to conceive the PO in a way that they think appropriate, with two sessions a year, one for planning and the other one for evaluation.
- In 2005 we had two POs, one to present the outline of the PARPA II and the second one to analyze its main draft.
- We have now the strategic matrix and have more or less agreed on the main indicators to monitor the implementation of PARPA II.
- We assume the implementation is the responsibility of all stakeholders. So, the coming PO should assess how far we have already gone. Each participant can make its own assessment. We will have no final decision or any commitment at the end of the PO, because the Government will have to consider and assess the recommendations afterwards.
- We don't have a final declaration at the end of a PO, as the Government does in the Joint Review with donors. What we usually do is a summary report after the PO. That summary report is prepared by the PO secretariat.

- With donors the Government has reached the consensus that the PAF should be integrated into our strategic matrix. PARPA matrix comprises more than 100 indicators, while the PAF has just 40 indicators.
- The Joint Review is more systematic and focuses specifically on the main pillars of the PARPA, through 24 thematic groups. The materials are publicly available at the donors' web page (<http://www.pap.org.mz/>, see details below).
- Since the year 2005 the CSOs have been invited to participate in the working groups and contribute to the Joint Review, but they are not part of the final agreements between Government and the international cooperation partners.
- On the question whether the MPD regards the PO as an event, perhaps a high level event, or a true mechanism, the interviewees responded it could be seen as both. Or at least, that should be the aim, though in the past it has certainly not been a tri-party mechanism with mutual commitments, accountability arrangements, terms of reference, and so forth.
- The MPD is the Secretariat of the PO, chiefly to administer and organize the preparatory meetings and the plenary PO.
- Strictly speaking, it is true that the PO has not been an ongoing process and mechanism, nor even something as sophisticated as for instance the Joint Review between the Government and the Donors.
- The MPD is considering calling the next PO soon, probably before the Joint Review starts or finishes, rather than afterwards. For this year we would like to assess the Balance of the 2006 PES (Yearly Government Economic and Social Plan), but that will have to be after being submitted and assessed by the Council of Ministers and the Parliament.

Final comments AF:

- On the question of what was the point of asking the PO to assess the Balance of the 2006 PES after it has been approved by the Parliament, the interviewees provided no clear explanation.
- At the end of the interview the consultants were invited to find out what the PO is perceived to be and make recommendations on how to improve it in the future.
- The World Bank is still speaking about a PARPA III, but the Government, or at least some people within the Government, wants to finish it, or merge the Government Programme and the PARPA. Then, the PARPA as it is nowadays would disappear. This is a rather controversial proposal, though this is not the place to discuss it.

4.1.2. MICOA (Ministry for Coordination of Environmental Affairs)

Meeting with the Permanent Secretary José Guambe, Maputo 22.02.07

- The PO is both a high level meeting and an inter-ministry coordinating commission.
- In most cases the PO appears as just an event, or a consulting opportunity, because there are no commitments and clear tasks.
- PO is an instrument to bring different actors together, including actors outside the Public Administration who are key for the success of public work, such as the case of the fight against poverty.
- Back in our mind, very often the PO is set forth and motivated by donors. This is an idea in our heads, which we need to change.
- One way to change such a perception of donor driven processes which should be more relevant to us than to foreigners is shift to the society some of the tasks and responsibility that in the past have been undertaken by public institutions and the government. For instance, religious missions could play a more active role in educating people. The Ministry of Education could finance and support the private and NGOs' initiatives.
- There are many situations where the State is not in the position to undertake certain tasks, but private and civil society organizations can do the work.
- We need to stop being prisoners of partnerships set up only between Government and Donors.
- For the POs there is a need to change the mythology and involve the citizens on specific things. Obviously, for that the Government should show the way for a better participation. Otherwise, people will be converted into observers, passive observers.

- The problem is that many of these initiatives, including the POs, only exist and continue to exist as long as there is a donor or an international agency subsidizing them. If donors did not pay for them, how many of them would survive just for 24 hours?
- Now, to change this situation, we need to go through a process in which the public institutions should increasingly assume a more managerial stance. The focus should shift from being accountable to donors and become accountable to one another.
- With regard to PARPA Mr. Guambe agreed that the Public Administration needs to act more professionally. At the local level, one way could be to merge and create some synergies between the PO and the district organs envisaged and identified in the LOLE. In this context, as the legal setting is concerned, the PO has little to offer.
- Perhaps the PO could keep its informality, which would allow accommodating a wide range of ideas and probably social arrangements. There is not much utility in converting the PO into an enforcing and legal mechanism. It could appear as an M&E instrument, but with a more professional and qualified approach with the objective to produce useful information and material.
- The PO could lead to a national council body, which is not the same as the district councils, but could be similar to them.
- With regard to the idea of moving forward into a more professional partnership between Government and national actors, Mr. Guambe sees that option consistent with the understanding that the State should not try to do everything. There are many things which need to be shared with key actors involved, including the beneficiaries. This is the core idea of public-private partnership, which can and should be set up with both profit-oriented entities and with non-profit organizations.
- Partnerships need to be developed in a variety of ways, depending on the objective and need for such a partnership. The State budget should contemplate that and support partnerships with private enterprises, or NGOs, or district entities.
- On the role of Parliament, Mr. Guambe sees no reason to involve it, because the partnerships should be seen as working method as a new approach of public administration. The Parliament should strengthen itself to assess the Government's programme. By the Constitution the entity that must make the Government accountable is the Parliament. But the PARPA is not an instrument required by Law to be present to the Parliament. The entity that should respond for PARPA is the Executive.

4.1.3. MICOA – A Key Player at the Past Provincial POs in Beira

Meeting with Timóteo Nguenha, Beira 29.02.2007

- Mr. Nguenha is perhaps one of the few people most knowledgeable on the previous POs in Beira, the person who holds the institutional memory on the PO in Beira at the Government.
- Until the end of 2006 there was a focal point at the Provincial Directorate for Finance and Planning, placed in Beira by the MPD but financed by UNDP to deal with the PARPA and, consequently, the PPOs as well.
- Now there is no focal point and nobody in Beira seems to know whether the previous one will be replaced by another one.
- In principle, there is a Secretariat to deal specifically with PO matters. However, there has been a certain retreat or withdrawal from those who have been appointed to the Secretariat.
- The 1^o PPO was held in September 2005. The various representatives invited presented their speeches, more or less around the PES. The level of debate was generally superficial and weak. "It was just a first experience. The kick off, so to speak".
- The 2^o PPO was in July 2006. The Governor briefed the participants on the first semester of the PES, but the main purpose of that PO was to disseminate the PARPA II.
- The PPO can be seen as a forum which brings together different representatives from government, including the Provincial Governor, the formal representatives of NGOs, including the G-20 and 15 other CSOs.
- The international cooperation partners also were invited, comprising a total of 10 organizations. Moreover, all district administrators were invited and the academic institutions as well.
- At a certain stage there was the idea to invite the political parties. But afterwards such an idea was left aside on the basis that parties are indirectly represented by members who are engaged in specific NGOs.
- The Secretariat comprises 12 members from the main actors composing the PO. This arrangement is somewhat different from the national secretariat, which is single-actor run, that is by the DNPO-MPD.

- In practice, it appears that these members slowly, one by one, are retreating from the Secretariat and giving less and less inputs to it.
- In 2006 only the focal point and I contributed actively to the secretariat. However, following the departure of the focal point there is no one in charge for the Secretariat. This issue has already been raised to the Provincial Director, but so far there is no answer. Even the M&E team that came to Beira in 2006 was informed that from the beginning of 2007 there was no focal point for PARPA.
- Everybody is engaged in their own activities. The chances for them to provide more attention to the Secretariat are minimal, chiefly because there is no incentive. Although the Secretariat members are not openly refusing to participate, in practice they are retreating from participating.
- On this the consultant questioned whether the weak participation and motivation are just a matter of lack of monetary incentives, or there is also lack of intellectual and political incentive. Indeed, in the past there were times during which people felt strongly motivated in participating for free, on the basis of the motivation and high expectations they had.
- Mr. Nguenha admitted that the lack of good content, methods and relevant purposes discourage people as well. Yes, added the interviewee, if people do not get any material reward, at least they need to get a moral and political reward. If you are not there for money, at least you should be there to fulfill meaningful expectations.
- The POs do not produce a final resolution, but some recommendations were outlined both by the Governor and some participants. One mistake in past POs regards its functioning. For instance, after a PO the Secretariat prepared a summary report. However, such a report is not distributed among the participants. It has only been sent to the MPD in Maputo and the Governor.
- Yet, the 2006 PPO produced one recommendation regarding the studies on poverty. Because there have been several studies, someone suggested that a consultant could do a systematization of existing studies. The GTZ-PRODER accepted to finance such a work.
- The systematization was finished, but nobody knows whether the results of this work will be discussed in the next PO. Those who lead these things show no interest in the proposed systematization.
- Now everything related to the PARPA is more or less abandoned. It is not the responsibility of MICOA to lead the processes associated with PARPA. We are also supposed to prepare the provincial strategic plan, but nobody wants to comment where the money for that task will come from. Nobody is made responsible for the PARPA, or even for the M&E process of implementation.
- We have a serious disease of not making people accountable for specific implementation issues. How are we going to break this vicious cycle? I don't know.
- Very often the abnormal things have become normal. On this and many other issues, it appears that our academics remain prisoners of some outdated political views and methods.
- In a certain way the POs at the provincial level are seen not as need but more as an imposition from the MPD, which in turn respond to Donors' pressure.

4.1.4. UCODIN (Unidade Coordenação do Desenvolvimento Integrado de Nampula)

Meeting with Felicidade A. Muiocha, Nampula 05.03.2007

- The PO is chiefly a learning process. We have always a new change to deal with.
- The first PO in Nampula in 2004 was to discuss the terms of reference.
- Then we had to learn how to gather appropriate information to assess performance. This is still an open question. Each year we think things are improving, but then we face new difficulties
- The PO in August 2005 was focused on the PARPA II. The latest PO in 2006 was to assess our performance and also the performance of our partners. The issue then was: how are our partners from the CS represented at the PO? We had preparation meetings before the plenary in which the Government presented its report of activities. We then met also the different actors of CS, including private sector, academics and non-profit organizations.
- A PO involves all the district administrators, all the provincial directorates and the NGOs, through two or three representatives of some of them. The private sector is allowed to take 10 people to the PO. We still don't have representatives from the informal sector.
- However, the Government started to think that it was not correct that only the government present a report for discussion. What about the CS?

- Then, we proposed to organize the CS by areas of intervention, such as health, education, roads, communications, and so forth. We then created what we call “forums”.
- A forum permits a channel for contacts between the provincial directorates and the NGOs. Those focused on water deal with the provincial directorate, while the others, say, related to agriculture, or education, or health, deal with their respective organizations.
- So in August 2006 we had the first experience in which, on the one hand, the government presented its report, and on the other, the CS presented its own report as well.
- This way, instead of having the CS criticizing the Government only, we then assess the CS. This is our way of dealing with participation in a balanced way.
- On the question: “Do you really regard CSOs as partners?” the answer was as follows: The PO is a session of consultation, in which the CS is allowed to express its own opinions. But it is true that we have never allowed for any sort of binding decision at those meetings.
- In the latest PO a matrix of indicators has been proposed. In the next PO we expect to assess the indicators of that matrix. In the 2006 PO most of the time was concentrated in assessing the indicators of last year.
- Are the indicators included in the matrix based on consensus, or did each main actor provide a set of indicators of its own interest? - Following the PO the UCODIN prepared the synthesis of the debates and distributed it to the sectors for comments. The synthesis of last PO is still a draft and has not been finished yet. So, we can share the draft, but not for quoting because it is not concluded.
- Last year the PO was initially planned for April. Then, the Governor could not attend and the PO had to be delayed until August.
- Following Frelimo Congress Nampula the Governor changed, because Mr. Paunde is now the General Secretary of Frelimo. The new Governor is still visiting the districts. We are waiting for the opportunity to find out from him how to move this year in relation to the PO. We don't have provisional dates for the next PO.
- Do the thematic groups have a continuous work throughout the year? Or are they meeting for the preparation of a specific PO? – The Government delegates report to the provincial directors who act as focal points for specific areas. When we were preparing the provincial PES, the provincial directors complained they had difficulties to find the CSOs associated with their areas.
- After the plenary the UCODIN prepares the summary and synthesis of what happened there, but we do have problems regarding monitoring. We must have a plan, a sort of a strategic plan.
- What about the Strategic Development for Nampula, which was supposed to cover the period 2003-2007. Does the PO assess the performance regarding such a strategic plan? No, we have never analyzed that plan. We have only focused on PES. During the past two years we concentrated our efforts in involving the CS in the preparation of PES. The process starts around May-June and goes through the rest of the year.
- In the PO we propose new projects, but nobody has warranty that the proposed projects will be approved in Maputo. Even if the provincial government approves it does not mean the project will be immediately approved in Maputo.
- At the district level people are elected for the Consultative Council. We expect that each district will develop its own district PES.
- We had high expectations in relation to the RAP, in the sense of consulting the community people at the district level. But it is difficult to cross and articulate RAP and PES. Let us see whether the CEPKA will help on this.
- The G20 in Nampula is no longer as active as used to be in the past. There is another organization called the forum of NGOs that claims to be the leader of CS, but in practice it does not lead. So we now lack a CS entity leading the CS.
- On the way forward: It is true the PO has no legal basis. For the time being it is just for consultation. We don't know how to improve from here. Is the legalization the best option to improve? We don't know. Perhaps the legal option would legitimize the decision more. We would have things more transparent and well defined.
- The former Governor was very keen in getting the PO moving and becoming relevant. Now, we don't know how things will go. Perhaps, if the PO were transformed into a legal entity each part would have to behave according to the rules set up in the regulation.
- Now we have the allocation of seven millions to the districts. So far, there has been no systematic assessment. Nobody has assessed whether the best option is to buy a tractor, as if the district administration were becoming a private producer.

- But the difficulty and weakness are not just between the province and the district. Likewise, things are not very well articulated between the province PO and the national PO. We are invited for the national PO, but to do what? Only to be present. We should not go there as observers.

Additional comments AF:

- Ms Felicidade Muiocha kindly promised and provided a set of documents on the PO, including:
 - The 2007 PES and Budget for Nampula
 - The synthesis of the plenary session of the 3^o PO, August 2006 (still in draft not to be cited yet);
 - The matrixes of the questions raised in the 2^o (2005) and 3^o (2006) POs; the latter is still seen as draft;
 - Two Power Point presentations of CSOs, one from Care/Save the Children and the other from World Vision
 - The agenda and list of participants at the 3^o PO
 - A document on the network of partners and the decentralization process;
 - Sector reports on education, agriculture
 - The presentation by ACIANA on the private sector matrix.

4.1.5. PPF: Planning and Finance in Nampula Province

Meeting with Vicente Paulo, Nampula 05.03.2007

- There has been a strong effort to build an effective way for citizen participation and allow for its increasing influence in the development.
- The Government does not decide alone with regard to planning. The citizen must be involved.
- A second step is to find out what the citizen does. How can he or she improve and take advantages from his/her potentials
- The citizen can get his/her voice through the district plans.
- Then, the Observatory emerged. We thought that calling it the Poverty Observatory was not a good expression. It undermines the purpose, and so we call it the Development Observatory.
- Although other interviewees did not complain whenever the mostly wide expression was used, Poverty Observatory, Paulo's remark is in fact confirmed by the documents mentioned above, which were provided by Ms. Felicidade Muiocha. The general title refers to the "Development Observatory" (DO), rather than the usual "Poverty Observatory".
- During the 2005 DO it was impressive the way the participants engaged in the debates of what had been planned and what needed to be undertaken. The focus changed in the 2006 DO, but we must admit that the strategic plan of Nampula was never appreciated.
- The government wants to update the plan because many things changed since the year 2003, such as the approval of LOLE, the PARPA II, and other instruments. The strategic plan is outdated, but it is true that it has not received much attention.
- Now we pretend to expand the strategic plan up to 2009. It was not clear how this will be done, when in fact such a plan has not yet become instrumental. However, Mr. Paulo repeated that there are new expectations and plans to correct and overcome the neglect the strategic plan has received.
- The district has more autonomy than the provincial level. This claim was not well explained. The more so when the interviewee explained that the recent allocation of 7 million Meticals for the districts was very good because such an allocation is with the purpose to generate profitable activities. In the past the district plans had no such a focus. In the past the focus was basically on basic social services.
- On the question whether the Government regards CS as its partner, Mr. Paulo responded: we are now paying the bill of past mistakes. That concern on partners appears to come from complaints from certain NGOs, such as Okhalihana. Those NGOs that emerged at a certain period when they were well subsidized. A lot of NGOs were created just to take opportunity from the financial support. When the bag was empty, then most of those NGOs disappeared.
- Dr Negrão did try to organize the CS around the G20 as the platform of CS. Then Okhalihana started to compete for the leadership and Mr. Cuinica from G20 in Maputo faced that competition.
- There is a certain competition in relation to financing and those organizations with no critical mass are disappearing. But those organizations have no social basis. Now, a new generation is emerging.

- In the end, the interviewee avoided to go directly to the question on the partnership issue. Instead, he preferred to comment on the disputes between the new and the old generation of NGOs and the difficulty to deal with the diversity.
- Paulo then remarked that now donors are finally realizing that the best thing is to provide the support directly to the Government, which is the one that should promote the private sector. The claim that the State should move away from the economy leads to failure. The past logic was the logic of wild capitalism. Now, donors are increasingly realizing the State should lead the economy and for that reason they are giving more and more support to the state budget.
- In the future we want to recover the concept of Development Observatory. Now, with coming Provincial Assemblies we might run the risk and danger of having party representations disputing irrelevant issues. In the past, the Observatories were not politicized, but we might run into politicization with the coming Provincial Assemblies.
- What will the future of the Development Observatory be? How is it going to articulate with the legal bodies? Nobody knows.
- The DO was intended to consult permanently, through a stronger network. With the former Governor, the Government started to make the CS accountable. We asked: Where is the CS? What is the CS doing? What about the private sector?
- An important step in the latest 2006 Observatory, though it has missed the strategic provincial plan, was that the CS appeared there more organized. They presented thematic networks, which allows for a better follow up. This is the most important partnership that one should do.
- With regard to the next Observatory Mr. Paulo claimed that everything is planned and the new Governor is already involved and aware. This claim contradicted the explanation provided by Ms Felicidade Muiocha. When requested to explain the contradiction Mr. Paulo said he was surprised with Ms Muiocha's remarks and would try to find out why she was so unclear. However, in spite of claiming everything is ready for the next PO, no exact date, agenda and specific steps have been given.

Final comments AF: A day after the above meeting, when the consultant returned to the UCODIN to pick up the promised material, Ms Muiocha expressed her concern, for she had already been approached by Mr. Paulo, who said that she had been ambiguous and not very clear. Apparently, according to what Mr. Paulo said to her over the phone she had given the impression that nothing has been done and the future is uncertain.

Meeting with Ivan Vasquez, Nampula 06.03.2007

- Ivan Vasquez is the PPF expert, working through an UNPD programme. He has been crucial in the preparation of the budgeting planning mechanisms.
- In the past district plans lacked the financial component. The UNDP expert came to articulate the plan and the budget, which in past years were done separately. This led to the so-called PESOD, the district budgeted PES.
- Nowadays the PESOD is becoming a national wide recognized methodology. Everything goes around the accounting comprising the revenues and expenses.
- The budget draws upon the district diagnosis, through participation techniques. When the allocation of seven million Meticais was decided the instruction was to focus on productive projects, project that generated revenues. By then we had already established our participation planning and we had to review our plan to include that focus on productive projects.
- At the district level people do request specific things. For instance, on a given district there was a demand for a millstone, but not just that. They want a millstone that should be run by a white boss. This shows the level of colonial alienation that remains, concluded Ivan Vasquez.
- Question by the consultant on whether such a request could also represent a certain frustration for the fact that in many cases the "baby" was thrown away with the bathwater, the UNDP expert refuted saying that in the past there was no planning, nor even accounting at the district level. Anything that might have existed was for whites and colonialists. After the independence everything that had been left by the colonialists was destroyed by the Apartheid regime. So, everything needed to be rediscovered from scratch, including the recognition of local authorities by the Government since the year 2000.
- Thus, the Government is now introducing an accounting system which the people have never had in the past, for the district administration in the colonial period was not for the benefit of the

people. This background can only be understood by those who have also suffered from the colonization, such as an Indian like the UNDP expert.

- Adding to the new system the UNDP expert explained the plan for a new development fund for the community called FUNDECO. This is not the place to get into details on the FUNDECO. Indeed, the FUNDECO is just a plan and has not yet been implemented.

4.2. Interviews to CSOs Directly Involved in Past POs

4.2.1. FDC: Foundation for Community Development



Fundação para o Desenvolvimento da Comunidade (FDC)

The FDC is a civic organization, with no political party affiliation, which seeks to join together the forces of all sectors of society in achieving an ideal of development, democracy and social justice. This Foundation arises from the conviction that poverty is not inevitable. It is the result of a complex mechanism of marginalizing and exploiting the poor; of feeble publicity for scientific and technical knowledge and appropriate technologies; of a system of access to resources which those social strata who do not benefit from education and involvement in the formal institutions of society and the economy find it hard to use. This series of factors has a negative impact on people's attitude to nature and to life, and also prevents them from using the resources that are already available for their own benefit in a sustainable way. These structural and psychological obstacles are the roots of the poverty that the FDC seeks to combat. <http://www.fdc.org.mz/mz/himbe.html>

Meeting with Executive Director (Paula Monjane), Maputo 15.02.07

Main points from the meeting:

- The interviewee started by saying there are other people at the FDC who know better the PO process and have been closely and for a longer period involved in the PO activities.
- The FDC has not yet given a thorough thought on the PO, but her understanding is that it is an opportunity for a dialogue and interchange.
- At the beginning the process seemed rather disorganized and participation of SC was fragmented and disperse.
- The RAP allowed for articulation among SC members.
- RAP could in fact be more focused on assessing the PARPA
- It continues to be an instrument of some use among CS members
- PO is just for consultation, and there is no commitment. Also there is no mechanism to find out whether recommendations have been taken into account.
- In a certain way G-20 has turned into an elite for the NGOs
- The idea of moving from consultation to partnership has not been considered carefully, but looks quite interesting
- FDC could play a leading role on moving forward. But FDC is not considering how to act more strategically. In the past FDC has participated in many areas, but now it is trying to take a step back and consolidate some areas. Up to now FDC has supported emerging NGOs. It has raised funds and is working with other organizations throughout the country
- How to act more effectively? This is FDC's concern at the present moment. For the time being, the FDC is trying to continue focusing on education, health, and food security. But it is still quite disperse. It is planning to focus on vulnerable children, particularly orphans.
- Some news have arrived that there are preparations for a new PO, in the middle of March. But if that is the case, said Paula Monjane, she fears that such a PO will be rather ad hoc. Usually, preparation meetings within CSOs are very much in a hurry, and very superficial. With this sort of arrangement, things can hardly improve.

- Within one month the CS will not be able to debate the issues.
- PO is more an event than a mechanism, to say nothing about partnership
- Paula Monjane provided a list of other relevant people for interviews, both in the FDC and other NGOs.
- At the end of the meeting the interviewee kindly mentioned and provided the contacts of other potential people to meet, both directly involved in the FDC or other from associated NGOs.

4.2.2. The G20 Secretariat



Preliminary Remarks AF:

- The name of G-20 emerged from the 20 CSOs that participated in the first Poverty Observatory in 2003, and afterwards set up a network that came to be known as the G-20. According to its first "Annual Poverty Report" [G-20, 2004], the network has since expanded to include more than 100 civil society organizations, involved in activities ranging from community development to debt reduction campaigning, health and HIV/AIDS, and socio-economic research. Although issues such as the share of the PARPA priority sectors in government expenditure may be discussed in the Poverty Observatory, the opportunity for substantive dialogue is limited by the fact that the Observatory meets only once a year, for one day (G-20, 2004; Hodges and Tibana, 2005).

Meeting with Secretary, Paulo Cuinica, Maputo 24.01.07

Main points from the meeting:

- PO is a new experience for CSOs, and it can undoubtedly get better.
- Past POs have varied in quality and standards. The second was probably the best as far as CS is concerned, because it involved and mobilized to take to the plenary debate our own assessment of poverty in Mozambique.
- In turn, the fifth PO was just for the launch of the new PARPA and there was no discussion.
- Apart from the PO, CSOs need take advantage of other mechanisms, such as: the Joint Review between Government and Donors and Consultative Councils at the district level.
- PO is informal, but even on that basis there is a certain commitment and gentlemen agreement to articulate and dialogue.
- The good reason for having a PO is that existing formal and legal accountability mechanisms are rather limited and weak. Starting from the Parliament, where the debates are either black or white. At the Parliament we cannot find a reasonable and fair assessment of reality. Both parties are rather biased by their own political stances.
- So, the sort of informal mechanisms, such as the PO, even though they are limited and informal, can play a useful role in pushing things into more effective accountability standards.
- The PO is led by the Government, particularly by the DNPO-MPD, which is the Secretariat.
- The PO is not just an event, nor even a series of events. It is an acting organism, set up on good-will basis and flexible mechanisms.
- The PO is the place where the Government is held accountable towards the citizens and donors. The fact that there are no outcomes that commit and make the parts mutually responsible may not be important. What matters most is the process, the enthusiasm for the participation in discussing important issues.
- The G-20 arrangement does not try to integrate all existing NGOs, particularly the professional associations which are set up around their specific and professional interests.
- The G-20 tries to bring together the NGOs that are willing to share common issues, which need to be taken into consideration by both Government and Donors. For instance, employment, lack of credit for small enterprises, and so forth.
- In 2005 the G-20 joined the Joint Review. In the first session it was not clear why we were invited and what could be our role. The two partners involved in the Joint Review never said explicitly we were there as observers, but the terms of reference made that clear and apparent.

- For the time being the best we can do at the Joint Review is just lobbying at the level of the working-groups and try to get our concerns considered.
- There is a significant difference between the G-20's report and the Joint Review's report. In the latter we find the supply side perspective: Donors give the money and the Government builds public goods, such as schools and health units.
- However, what is the perspective of the demand side? People might regard a school or a given health unit as useless, because they are more concerned in getting medication, a doctor, a nurse or a good teacher. This is where the G-20 should come in and provide the CS perspective.
- The G-20 is having an internal discussion on how to organize itself better. Some think the G-20 should become formalized and legal entity. This option would help us to be administratively independent from, for instance the FDC, which has in the past hosted us, by providing a bank account, an office and other facilities. But other people think the G-20 should continue as it is, in order to respond to its constituents.
- The G-20 is assessing the different options, and for that we have a consultant assessing and proposing the options.

Additional Information from other sources on the G20:

- On the 13.03.2007 Paulo Cuinica made a public presentation on the G-20 Plan for 2007.
- The presentation started by saying that since 2003, the G-20 has grown from just 20 NGOs to several hundreds organizations, and it is not stopping growing. No evidence for this claim was provided.
- The G-20 has spread to ten provinces and is already present in many districts. The provincial G20 are autonomous, have their own dynamics, are mostly locally based, and are closely linked to the national Secretariat.
- The G20 regards the PO as a conquest or a good achievement for the CS. It still needs improvement, in order to make CS participation relevant for the Joint Reviews undertaken two times a year. The existing POs should be expanded to lower levels, including to the district levels (Consulting Councils) with the objective to increase ownership.
- The main strategy of G20 is threefold: capacity development, participation and analysis. The capacity building should be in cascade, from the central level to the district. The participation should be inclusive and focused on the 2006 PES, the preparation for the 2007 PES and contributions for 2008 planning. The criteria for the involvement at the district level should be set up by the Technical Group, after a more in-depth analysis of the District Consultative Councils with regard to the level of citizens' participation, how they are contributing to the well-being of citizens, and how they are evaluating the inputs (e.g. 7 million Mts allocated) and the outputs (quality of the services and goods provided by the State).
- Carlos Fumo is the consultant in charge to study the G-20 platform and propose alternative ways to operationalize it. A Power Point presentation has already been discussed with the members of the G20 Secretariat.
- The consultant's main preliminary findings were the following:
 - Three main reasons for the emergence of the G20: 1) Donor pressure associated with the HIPC and the preparation of the first PRSP; 2) CS's growing maturation, through processes such as the land campaign, debt, and landmines issues, which demand a more institutionalized involvement in the development process; 3) Openness from the Mozambican Government for a more institutionalized relationship, through the PO.
 - G20 as a platform for: 1) A direct relationship and participation at the PO; 2) Organized articulation with the Government, private sector and donors; 3) Bringing together diversified ideas and interests: "One voice; strengthening through union".
 - G20 platform is characterized by. 1) Informal collaboration; 2) Small (structure) and strong (capacity) secretariat; 3) Efficient communication; 4) Inclusiveness at all levels (national, provincial and district).
 - Main challenges in the past: 1) Maximization of opportunities that emerged to influence the development process (e.g. PO, PARPAII, Joint Review, RAP); 2) Recording the experience.
 - Key players in the G20: 1) Dr. Negrão as the founder and key leader; 2) The GMD and FDC as the main promoters; 3) The initial CSOs that joined the platform and contributed for the G20's image of confidence and credibility.

- One of the strategies of the G20 should be the use of the PO and the Joint Review as platforms for dialogue, influence the way the resources are allocated, strengthening social responsibility, capacitate the CS for strategic partnerships and act as a broker, promote special relationships with media.
- Alternative scenarios for the G20 in the future: 1) Scenario 1: Continue on an informal basis, as a FDC guest. The FDC would continue to provide technical and administrative assistance, serve as a “legitimate face” for the CS platform, and then there would be some coordinating groups comprised of key organizations selected from various CSOs; 2) Scenario 2: A formal and legally registered organization, legally autonomous, with a strong secretariat and formal linkages with the provincial G20s. The disadvantage of this option, according to the consultant, is the highly concentrated power and a high risk that the secretariat will become detached from its constituents, turning into yet another NGO; 3) Scenario 3: A network or a “nomadic” and rotating organization. While this option could promote more inclusion and ownership from the CSO members, it does not allow for a more effective and continuous intervention.

Final comments AF:

- During the interviews some of the interviewees commented on the above debate regarding the future of the G20. The CTA people (see below) remarked the analysis is still too focused on the process, and not attention has been given to outcomes and specific indicators on efficiency and effectiveness of G20's performance.
- Another interviewee made the point that the G20 should have a fourth option, which is to extinguish the Secretariat and allow for a more diverse process of strengthening the CS.
- He argued that there is little sense and usefulness in the efforts to get the CS speaking with “One Voice”. Such a so-called consensus can only be achieved by reducing quality, meaning and the content of the main development issues.
- In the long run this is not useful for a good development, because CS will have to scarify too much.
- Still other interviewees raised doubts on the claim that the G20 represents several hundreds organization.
 “Such a claim can only stand until the day someone challenges them to provide evidence. The G20 can hardly manage to bring 100 people together in one room. How can they claim they represent three, four or five hundred organizations? That is a typical wishful thinking. They like to daydream”.

4.2.3. CTA: Confederation of Business Associations of Mozambique



<http://www.cta.org.mz/en/index.htm>

CTA – Confederation of Business Associations of Mozambique web site

In our continuing efforts to create a better environment for Mozambican business, we will use this web page to present actions undertaken by businessmen who are contributing to remove red tapes to investments and entrepreneur's development, through the promotion of public and private partnership.

Paulo Fumane
 CTA, Executive Directo

Meeting with Paulo Fumane and Jim Lafleur, Maputo 16.02.07

Main points from the meeting:

- CTA is rather privileged in making input at several forums: G-20, G18, and others.
- However, G-20 does not have good instruments to assess impacts.

- With José Negrão G-20 made important steps towards a systematic assessment. CTA has contributed to the outline of a matrix for assessment of poverty.
- A consultancy is underway on the role of G-20 regarding the PARPA. So far, the consultant seemed too focused on the methodology and the process, but he has been advised to focus more on the impacts.
- G-20 is becoming more sophisticated and able to make assessment, but still lacks the proper indicators
- People join the G-20 because we have a common cause: to reduce poverty. However, with regard to some relevant issues, it is difficult to have common positions. For instance, the controversy on land tenure.
- Lafleur considers that PO should only happen after the meetings of G18, G20 and the Government. The G-20, as the representative of CS, should have a better coordination and a common agenda, a small but focused agenda, such as: raise the productivity, or increase employment.
- Nowadays, the PO has three different matrixes: one from the G20, another one from the G18 (Joint Review) and the third one, from the Government. They are not immediately compatible. This is another thing that needs improvement. Before a PO, each actor should debate its own concerns.
- CS must demand results and concrete impacts.
- CS could move into partnership, but for that CS and in particular G20 should be better focused.
- CTA has its own channels to take its concerns to the consideration of the Government.
- Unfortunately, the issues raised by the CTA regarding land tenure, have been confused by some populist stances.
- CTA thinks that it is not advisable to bring professional associations to the G20, because professional associations are too focused on their own interests and concerns.
- CTA clarified that PO is just consultative and based on general opinions, with no commitments.
- The agenda the CS takes to the PO is not focused and has no clear indicators for assessment. However, things are moving slowly apparently into the right direction.
- For the time being, CTA sees the PO as just a high level event.
- CS is supposed to be the key beneficiary of PARPA. So, in principle the PO should be one of the opportunities to assess to what extent the Government is implementing its commitments.
- The problem is that the PO does not have any sort of linkage between those who are involved on it and the elected bodies, such as the Parliament.
- The relationship between external accountability (Government to Donors) and domestic accountability (Government to Parliament and CS) is rather diffuse and informal. Accountability of Government to Donors does not hamper or undermine accountability of Government to citizens. On the contrary, Donors can play the role of CS's surrogate or representative.

PS: After the interview Lafleur sent supporting and complementary material, such as:

- "An economic analysis of natural resources in Mozambique, Rural Land issues and Policies", a paper by Gordon Hughes, from the World Bank.
- CTA. 2006. Discussion papers. 9^o Private Sector Annual Conference, Maputo, November 2006.
- Lafleur, Jim. 2006. "Concession Titles on Rights for Land Use", Paper for discussion at the 9^o Private Sector Annual Conference.

CTA-AIMO: Meeting with Kekobad Patel, Maputo 02.03.07

Main points from the meeting:

- Patel is the President of AIMO (Mozambican Industrial Association), one of the most active associations at the CTA.
- The PO brings together people from a wide spectrum of civil society organizations, with multiple and often contradictory interests and motivations.
- Only when the issue is for instance PARPA then people come together, in the sense that regardless of the specific interests and approaches on economic development, we all agree that poverty needs to be reduced. But here stops the agreement.
- There were times, in past POs, in which we reached a critical point, almost a clash. That happened not long ago, when the issue of land has risen during one of the POs. Mozambique has

a rather valuable asset that is land, which because of the law that still exists simply complicates and devaluates that valuable asset.

- The CTA raised the issue of finding out a transitional way for reasonable land exchange. That very issue took the debate to a stand still situation, simply because the powerful and very influential politicians refuse to even discuss the matter.
- That session was led by the Primer Minister. All the government people were simply scared and tense, simply because they thought the CTA wanted to propose the privatization the land. But the issue is more important than simply changing the law and introducing the privatization.
- We need to value the land, this is the main problem. What we are doing now is simply nonsense. Then, we ask openly whether the Government really wanted us to withdraw the issue we raised from the agenda. But if they really wanted to withdraw such an issue from the agenda, those who run the PO should do it on their own risk and responsibility.
- This is just an example to show that if we really want to take the PO seriously, then we must accept that there will be times the opinions will not be congruent and in consensus.
- Why do I participate in such a forum like the PO? We have been trying to use the available opportunities to share and debate our concerns. But, yes, we might have to assess what to do, how to participate in a more effective way, and avoid wasting our time.
- So far, we have participated in the POs for reasons not very well explained and made explicit. To be frank, such a forum does not discuss relevant issues, such as the land issue, or the industrial policy, and how to implement policies better.
- On the question, whether the Government is prepared to discuss development issues beyond its own agenda, issues that really matter for the national agenda, Patel was far from positive.
- He recalled the Agenda 2025 as a good effort to bring people with different views together.
- However, in most cases the existing participation mechanisms serve only, as Patel put it, “to burn people”.
- The Mozambican private sector suffered tremendous consequences with the war, but when the debt relief came, no support has been given to clean up the banking problems some companies still have. So, why we cannot discuss this sort of issues? How can we strengthen a market economy in these circumstances?
- PO should become a really partnership mechanism, but for that everything should change, including its concept, methods and the objectives. As it is, the proposal for the PO agenda comes from the Government, and we react with more or less interest. But this will take us far.
- Why don't we discuss the value of the existing composition of the National Assembly or the Parliament? That very body costs the Mozambican tax payers millions of dollars. What for? Can a country such as Mozambique afford that bill? For how long? Until when will the tax payer accept that more than 90% of the deputies come to sit and sleep for months at the Parliament and never open their mouths? They just clap their hands. They could do that on a much cheaper basis, from their own places, through radio.
- So, if politicians are not willing to discuss this sort of issues, but at the same time the deputies claim a 28% rise of their salaries, then it becomes obvious how low the political will is to fight poverty.
- There are many issues which could become part of the PO, such as: national budget; how the government manages and increases the unproductive as compared to productive jobs; labor law (on this, once again, the CTA has been accused of playing in favor of foreign interests).
- We have become experts in producing law, but what for?
- Eventually the CTA will have to conclude that it should simply focus on its own conferences, make our own assessments of the economic situation, and avoid being swallowed by an empty consensus.
- Even at our conference we have not always managed to discuss the relevant issues, but there the Government must take a more careful position. The Government can no longer afford to alienate itself from the private sector.
- The national private sector should increasingly voice its own views. In many cases the Government might not accept. But we need to separate the waters. We are convinced that a better business environment attracts more business. Our intentions are clear. If the CSOs do not understand that such a position is as good for them, then it is better we do not waste our time in those forums which do not pay off.
- As a way forward:
 - 1^o - We need to acknowledge that relevant issues are not discussed during the plenary session of the POs, but which is worse neither are they discussed in preparatory meetings leading to the plenary session.

- 2º - Are we really interested in discussing relevant development issues? So far the time and resources are just spent on finding sophisticated ways to avoid discussing the relevant issues?
- 3º - “Now, you come here wondering how to bring meaningful issues to the PO. Very interesting!” But, please, be aware that the way it is set up now is exactly to achieve the opposite. You just have to pay attention on how the whole process is organized.
- The question that you, the consultants need to analyze carefully is whether or not the way the POs are organized fulfils its minimalist purpose. That is, to please, or perhaps cheat donors, who continue insisting that governance should be participatory and Government’s plans on poverty should listen to the people.
- Reports are usually not written innocently. In the end, let us see how your own findings will be presented and written.

4.2.4. Associação Sociedade Aberta (S.A)

Meeting with Hermenegildo Mulhovo and Ermínio Nhaguiombe, Maputo 16.02.07

Main points from the meeting:

- The interviewees are key members of the SA, but they are employed by FDC.
- The SA is an NGO comprised of recently graduated students or students who are about to finish their degrees and face the new reality of the labor market.
- The SA has 36 members. Its main activity has been the preparation of a diagnosis of the market place and socioeconomic conditions of given communities. In particular, they contributed directly for the provincial RAP, a KAP (Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices) study, a diagnosis on local government, and the UNICEF study on the situation of Mozambican children.
- The SA has been quite active in the preparation of Provincial POs, in Maputo Province.
- The SA hosts the G-20 at the provincial level, in Maputo Province.
- In 2005, during the preparation of PARPA II, the SA used the Provincial PO to propose some improvements in the draft on PARPA made public.
- The latest PO in Maputo province was basically to present PARPA II.
- The interviewees understand the relevant objective of the PO is to bring key actors together. However, very often the suggested or agreed proposals made before, or during the POs cannot easily be visualized in the draft of documents discussed. This happens both at the national and provincial levels.
- In spite of the opportunity for dialogue, the interviewees said they identify the real impact of the PO in terms of improving the actors’ performance and activity. Actually, the PO seems to play more a role of legitimization of the official discourse.
- On the preparation of RAPs: Firstly, the themes are chosen on the basis of an ad hoc debate. When Negrão was our leader, he was very keen in pushing the agenda for issues on rural development. He wrote several papers on the issues that concerned the civil society.¹ After Negrão the tendency has been to articulate his proposed line of research and another topic such as participation. But not much work has been done on participation.
- The RAPs do not follow a continuous methodology. They have changed with no anticipated criteria. Some of the contributions from provincial actors are not given due attention at the national level of RAP, in part because there are many provinces and in practice it becomes difficult to gather everything. But the other reason is that the national RAP has not yet defined a clear way of

Box 3.2: Open Society Association



SOCIEDADE ABERTA: Academia Comunidade Acção

(Note: The image contains several columns of small text in Portuguese, which appears to be a translation of the original text provided in the image. The text discusses the organization's mission, its role in the community, and its commitment to social development and participation.)

¹ See the bibliographic references, Negrão (2002, 2003).

incorporating the contributions from the province. The very few contributions are often ignored, such as those from Zambezia and Inhambane.²

Final Remarks AF:

- The interviewees informed that on the day before the interview the Secretary of the national G-20 was informed that the MDP is scheduling a new PO, but no date is known yet. Apparently, the next PO is scheduled for the 16th of March, though this is just an indicative date, and in the past it often has been changed several times.
- Moreover, the interviewees described the current networking among several CSOs, including the G-20, the GMD, Red-cross, Link, Monaz (network on HIV/SIDA). They mentioned that some NGOs have recently retreated and stepped back, or showing no interest in participation as they did in the past. They preferred not to mention any particular NGO, and considered it a good initiative to undertake a systematic study on the characteristics and present situation of CS in Mozambique.
- They commented with some interest on a recent paper from Benjamin Pequeno (November 2006), called "*Sociedade Civil em Moçambique: voz do povo ou negócios através de projectos?*". As its title suggests the paper debates whether the so-called representatives of CS can in fact be seen as the voice of the people or are more a sort of business through specific projects.
- A relatively new organization which is increasingly becoming visible in the public debate is the Center for Public Integrity (CIP), led by Marcelo Mosse, one of the selected interviewees for this work (see below).
- As promised by the interviewees, at a later stage, they send by email additional material prepared by the SA, such as: the diagnosis on the CS in the Province of Maputo, a facts-sheet on the SA, and the Provincial RAP.

4.2.5. Grupo Moçambicano da Dívida (GDM): Mozambican Debt Group


Meeting with Fernando Menete, Maputo 21.02.07

- Fernando Menete's has already been mentioned in the first delivery, with regard to his remarks³ on CS's participation. He is a member of the GDM, in charge for capacity building and communication.
- He has never attended any plenary session of past POs, but since 2003 Menete has contributed to the preliminary and preparatory work of the POs.
- He recalls that PO is, at least in part, the product of CS demand for something like an open Observatory of Poverty.
- Earlier in the current decade, the GDM was doing work for the debt relief. We needed a space for open dialogue. In 2001, Oya's (2001) proposed Strategy for consultation prepared for the Ministry of Planning and Finance, quoted a GMD's document which put forward a proposal for a more formal and institutionalized space of consultation and debate and monitoring of the PRSP in Mozambique. This was before PARPA I was officially approved; around September 2001.
- The GMD called a National Committee for Monitoring Poverty (see Figure 2). At that stage we proposed the involvement of the Parliament, but in practice that idea was never taken into account.
- In part we thought it better to avoid being taken over by parties, though the limitation of the existing setting is that we have no linkage with the legal power.
- In 2003 the GDM moved on and started to focus on the agenda, the structure of the proposed organization of the PO made by the Government.
- Up to now, we have never resumed the initial idea of dealing with the PO more as a mechanism than just an event. Our focus was concentrated in the preparation of our own RAPs.
- Some say the Government now wants to do the PO before the Joint Review, but the interviewee remarked that will probably not work properly, in case the next PO will be held in the middle of March. By then the Joint Review has not finished its working process meetings. Often this finishes only by the end of March or even in April.

² The consultant received a copy of these two provincial reports.

³ Menete, Fernando. 2007. Opportunity for Participation. <http://www.kepa.fi/international/english/information/newsletter/>.

- In the past, the relevant work done by the organizations that actively participate in the G-20 is associated with the RAPs (2004, 2005 and 2006 still in progress).
- One of the side effects of the participatory process in the PARPA preparation, as it has been done in the past years, is that it dilutes the critical analysis of some activists. Some of those who in the past were very critical of the World Bank and IMF's policies became soft and abandoned their criticisms, not because they changed their mind with regard to such international actors but just because they are now involved in the PARPA.
- The debate is now broader, but if the content and substance of the debate is not meaningful and produces nothing, then the issue is how to change the terms of the debate. Negrão was doing his best to raise the standards of RAP, but after his death we appear to give more attention to participation than the purpose of the participation.



- The Joint Review is not grasping our interest. Very few people go to their meetings.
- We are starting to realize that we are contradicting ourselves. We were the ones who pushed for the institutionalization and formalization of the dialogue among the various actors. Our motivation was to avoid the ad hoc methods and improvisation, but we now realized we become preys of the very ad hoc methods we once tried to get rid off.
- If the next PO really goes ahead within the next month, it is apparent that we will not have time for a proper preparation. The secretariat of the G-20 has no time to contact its members and request a reasonable preparation. Indeed, we still know nothing on the agenda for such a PO.
- It is no surprise that some of the NGOs are showing signs of giving up and will not appear. However, in the end what will be stated is that the CS has been involved and that those who wished to participate had the opportunity to do it.
- Menete commented on the lack of linkage between the PO and the Parliament, which reduces the relevance and usefulness of the PO. Debates and efforts to think on relevant issues are dispersed and apart from one another.
- Who are the leading organizations at the G-20? The following organizations have been highlighted: GMD, CCM, Cruzeiro do Sul (at least until the death of Negrão), the ABIODES, FDC, CTA and OTM.
- There is still plenty of space to improve the level of debate in the CS, a space that we still have to fill and use.

- If the quality of the CS is not better it is, at least in part, due to our methodologies.
- Among the CS activists we have different approaches on participation. While some prefer to focus on the PARPA, others think it better to turn the attention to the RAP.
- The GMD is facing a crisis of vision. In 2001 we were very active and managed to gather and mobilize the support to get the debt relief. But after that we have relaxed.
- What has the GMD been doing as far as monitoring the usage of the money saved from the debt relief? Apparently, not much. In the past years the GMD has produced no single report on the impact of the debt relief and how the money has been used.⁴
- The interviewee confirmed the information given by the CTA representatives with regard to the consultancy the G-20 has requested with the objective to identify the main options for the G-20? 1) To continue as it is? 2) To formalize the G-20 and turn it into a legal entity? 3) To create a rotating secretariat? The consultancy is under way. People are debating, but so far there is no idea what the way will be.
- Why CS activists participate in the processes such as the PARPA? Menete pointed out a wide range of motivations and expectations: 1) To be listened and accounted for; 2) To contribute for the monitoring and evaluation process; 3) To be recognized as a key actor; 4) To follow and simply observe; 5) To legitimize the work done by the Government and donors.

Final Remarks AF:

- Besides the interview, Menete kindly provided additional and supportive material, such as the following drafts on the genesis and progress of the G-20:
 - GDM. 2000. Programa de Divulgação (Dissemination Program): External debt and poverty as the structural adjustment, 27.01.2002; The initiative of debt relief made by donors; Issues on the HIPIC and its impact for Mozambique (10.05.2000); Mozambique and the HIPC initiative (November 1998; Draft of PARPA, February 2000; Interim poverty reduction strategy paper (PRSP), 16.02.2000; Briefing on the poverty reduction strategy (PRSP); Poverty reduction strategies: what are they and how to participate?, September 2000; Monetary strategy, 20.07.2000 (the source of Figure 2, above).
 - G20's national meeting for balance: the onset and evolution of the G20, 22.06.2006.
 - Meeting of the G20's coordinating group, 12.06.2006.

4.2.6. CCM: Christian Council of Mozambique

Meeting with Inocêncio dos Anjos, Maputo 21.02.07

- The interviewee had just moved to Maputo City from Nampula City. So, the bulk of his experience with the PO refers more to Nampula than Maputo City.
- The CCM is a forum of about 24 protestant churches.
- In Nampula there has been an effort among different actors to share what each actor has done, including the Government, international partners and the CSOs.
- Usually the debates are around the main pillars of the PARPA.
- It is not easy to distinguish the role of each actor because the discussions are held by sector or main areas (education, economy, health, etc.).
- In Nampula the main CS movement is led by the G20. The Forum, the so-called "Okhaliana" does not work properly.
- On the question "what is the purpose of the PO?" Mr. dos Anjos responded: "The civil society wants to have a door or a window open to raise its concerns. We need to be listened".
- The former Provincial Governor, Mr. Paunde, used to say that the assessment should concentrate both on the Government and the CS. The Government usually reports and informs on what is doing, but civil society should do the same as well.


⁴ On this, see Hodges and Tibana, 2005.

- The view of the former Governor was transparency and openness. If the Government presents its report, the civil society must do the same. Paunde often said that CS like to criticize the Government, but its representatives never report what they are doing.
- The preparation for the PO is mostly ad hoc. People learn about a new PO more or less a month before it takes place. In general, the preparation is led by the UCODIN, the coordinating unit created by the Provincial directorate to interact with the CS.
- The meetings, including the POs are not committing the participants to any accountable mechanisms.
- International partners in Nampula are not donors, which is often the case in Maputo. In Nampula the international partners are implementing agencies, rather than donors.
- There are relevant issues for the economic development that need to have a better discussion in the POs, such as: 1) The uncontrolled logging of trees is happening in many parts of Nampula; 2) The same happens with the mineral resources.
- It is not enough to raise issues during the plenary session of a PO. We should find a way to follow the issues in between of POs.

Final Remarks AF:

- Mr. dos Anjos was very helpful in suggesting potential key people in Nampula for further contact (see below the summary of some of the interviews).

4.2.7. FOPROSA: Provincial Forum of Sofala's Non-Government Organizations



Meeting with José Luís Gundana, Beira 28.02.2007

- FOPROSA comprises 93 NGOs, but only 72 are registered. The web page of FOPROSA displays at least part of the data base, which has been updated. Following the meeting Mr. Gundana provided an Excel file with some details on the NGOs resisted at the FOPROSA. Table 3.4 provides a sample of the registered data base.
- FOPROSA is now getting financial and technical support from the German public-private partnership called DED-PPP, but it will widen its supporting basis.
- FOPROSA is aiming at providing services on capacity building, professional courses and administrative services. In the next two years the Forum will concentrate into local governance.
- The POs serve to exchange opinions. It serves just for dialogue, dialogue, dialogue, and nothing else.
- The first PO, in 2005, left no remembrance. It was just for official speeches.
- For the second PO, in 2006, the provincial government started by saying that it would focus on the provincial PES. FOPROSA started to prepare itself according to the initial agenda. One month before the PO the expectation was that the PES would be the focus. Suddenly, the date of the PO was brought forward from August to July. We had just one month, and nobody knew the exact agenda for the PO.

Box 3.4: Example of the Data Base of FOPROSA

SIGLA	SIGNIFICADO	DESCRIÇÃO
A.JO. CHI	Associação de jovens de chibabava	Formação (emprego)
ACAMO	Associação dos cegos amblípes de moçambique	Defesa dos deficientes visuais
ADC	Organização de Fomento do desenvolvimento comunitario	implementação participativa de soluções para problemas comunitarios
ADEC	organização dos direitos humanos e democracia	Justiça social
ADEL - SOFALA	Agencia de Desenvolvimento Economico Local	Desenvolvimento Economico Local
ADEMIMO	Associação de deficientes militares e para militares de moçambique	integração dos dos deficientes as actividades economicas
ADR	Associação para o desenvolvimento da rapariga	Sensibilização HIV / SIDA
ADS	Acção para o desenvolvimento social	Assistencia social as comunidades
AJODEMO	Associação de jovens deficientes Moçambicanos	Projectos
AJULSID	Associação Jovenil de luta contra sida e droga	Serviços basicos
AJV - SOFALA	Associação dos jovens voluntarios	Projecto
AMACO	Associação Moçambicana de apoio a comunidade	melhoramento de condições basicas
AMODEG	Associação moçambicana dos desmobilizados de guerra	enquadramento dos desmobilizads
AMODIA	Associação Moçambicana dos Diabeticos	Porta voz dos diabeticos
ASAL	associação Salvação	redução do sofrimento das familias
CADECOS	Associação monte Sinai	Desenvolvimento integrado
CCM	Conselho Crisatão de moçambique	humanitario
CODEZA	Corredor de desenvolvimento comunitario da região do vale do zambeze	Desenvolver vale do Zambeze
COMUTRA	Comite da mulher Trabalhadora	Promoção da mulher no sindicato.
CVM	Cruz Vermelha de moçambique	Saude e emergencias
KUGARISSICA	Associação jovenil para o desenvolvimento comunitario	Implementação de projectos
KULAMUCA		Desenvolvimento comunitario
LDH	liga dos direitos humanos	Justiça social
OCM	Organização continuadores de moçambuque	Crescimento da criança
OJCD	Organização Jovenil contra a droga	Prevenção e combate a degradação dos jovens
PENHAI	Associação juvenil Penhai	Crianças orfãos
PNDH	Pressão Nacional dos direitos humanos	Educação cívica e moral
SOTEMAZA		recuperação infra estruturas destruidas pela guerra e construoões publicas (escolas, hospitais, internatos, creches etc
TRIMODER	Movimento de Desenvolvimento Regional	Melhoramento da renda familiar

- Eventually, the agenda was changed. There was no longer the focus on PES and each actor would present its report on its own activities. Each one would present its own balance of what it had done until then.
- On the 28th of July 2006 the PO was held. This PO was better than the first one, because different actors were allowed to say something. The Governor closed the plenary with some recommendations on how people could overcome poverty. He gave the example of people who raise cattle, but they do not use the milk and they consume the meat. Yet, people continue complaining they are poor.
- However, nothing was decided as to future POs and what should we do until the next PO. The problem is probably not in the plenary session of the POs. It is much earlier, in the preparatory work for the plenary sessions.
- Until recently the UNDP financed one consultant who was placed at the Provincial Directorate of Planning and Finance. He was the one in charge to lead and organize the POs.
- There is also a Technical Secretariat comprising the focal points of several organizations, including FOPROSA, the G20, and some international cooperation partners (DED, GTZ and Italian cooperation).
- Last year some of the CSOs cast some doubts regarding the low quality of the POs, in terms of its content and the way it has been prepared. However, things seem not have changed or improved.
- We have already expressed some criticisms on the way the POs have been organized. The organization is rather frivolous. I personally have questioned the ad hoc way it is organized.
- The overall process leading to the plenary PO needs to be more efficient, but then we still need to know the real purpose of such events. What is it for?
- The PO has no legal personality, is not an institutionalized entity. I have raised this issue last year.
- I defend that the PO should be formalized legally. This is an important step to take it seriously. As it is, nobody knows. It is up to the Governor. The first was held in September 2005. The second one was expected to be in August, but then the Governor decided to hold it in July. Now, we are expecting one for May, but it is just a guess.

- The legal formalization would give the CSOs an opportunity to demand that the Government respects the law. It would also show how much commitment the Government places into the POs.
- When we compare the PO with the organs within the LOLE at the district level, we can see there a basis for a partnership. It may still be a weak partnership because the administrator consults, but is not accountable to the people. He is more accountable to the Governor. In any case, the law demands and expects the administrator consults and shares his work with the consultation councils.
- At the provincial level there are no such mechanisms as we can find at the district level.
- In Sofala if the Government wants to get in touch with the CSOs it must do it through the FOPROSA, rather than the G20. We have very good relationship, but the G20 in Sofala is not as prominent as the G20 in Maputo. Because of its roots with the GMD, here the GMD is with the trade unions. This is the reason why the G20 is placed at the trade unions.
- This might be the reason why the G20 in Maputo neglects the FOPROSA and in the past never invited us for a national PO. Last year the G20 from Maputo sent tickets for the G20 representative here in Beira and two other small NGOs. Unfortunately, they continue to disregard and neglect FOPROSA.

Final comments AF:

- Besides the interview, Mr. Gundana kindly provided several documents on FOPROSA, a copy of the latest CSOs' report presented at the second provincial PO, and documents on FOPROSA's associative status.
- Another interesting document shared with the consultant is a work undertaken for FOPROSA, by the consultant Eduardo Chiziane, entitled: "The Civil Society Participation in the Process of Governance and Local Development". This is a hundred pages work, which cannot be discussed here at length, but contains some interesting considerations on citizen participation under the existing legislation.

4.2.8. Okaliahama – Forum of CSOs in Nampula

Meeting with Ernesto Lopes, Nampula 6.03.2007

- Mr. Lopes is both the president of an association for agriculture and livestock development, called ADAP, with 39 members and the Okaliahama, a term in local language that means "mutual help"..
- The Okaliahama does not have own resources and must compete for funds as any other NGO. The latter has 56 members.
- He attended the latest PO in Nampula. CS participated according to the specific themes, or thematic areas. He regarded the latest PO as relatively good, at least in comparison with the 2005 PO, which he considers had too many incorrect declarations.
- CS needs to have a periodic dialogue with the Government. The former Governor provided conditions for such a dialogue, but the new one nobody knows.
- It is not easy to speak with the Municipality President, one of the five Presidents elected by secret vote.
- It may appear strange, but in the circumstances it is easier to approach a nominated leader than one who was elected. At a certain stage the CS wanted to share its views with regard to the rubbish in the city, but we could not find a way to create a debate.
- When people from CS find openness, it is with people with no power to take decisions. Thus they listen and keep quiet. If one insists in getting a position, then they excuse themselves, saying they are no the best person to comment or take a decision.
- The idea that civil society is weak is only partially true. The very government and even many leaders are the ones who weaken CS. They do it by not creating effective mechanisms of real accountability.
- We admit that at a certain stage the CS relied a lot on financial money from international agencies. But if those organizations provide support to Mozambique, why does the bulk of it go to the Government? Is this the way to strengthen the civil society? Doesn't look like.

4.2.9. AMAZ, G20 and Facilidade in Nampula

Meeting with Odete Muchanga, Nampula 6.03.2007

- Ms Muchanga is the president of AMAZ, a Water Consumers Association. AMAZ has 23 members, besides some workers employed for specific works.
- AMAZ has been set up to raise the awareness that people should share the costs of consuming water.
- With regard to the relationship between AMAZ and Okalihama, she considers that the latter has no good leadership. The CS used to be coordinated by the G20, but only until its leader moved to Maputo.
- The dialogue within CSOs is not easy. The difficulties are more for personal than professional problems. In contrast, when we go to the communities people are general easy to deal with.
- The district councils not always discuss the relevant issues, but the NGOs should help them to improve.
- There is a good openness between the Government and CS, but to what extent is such openness well-used by CS?
- With regard to partnership, that would be a good step to aim for. But for that we do need trust and confidence among ourselves.
- In the past few years we started to feel better because the Government started to approach CS and recognize that the State can do very little if it works alone.
- AMAZ has interactions with some public entities throughout the year. For some cases the provincial director is the one who interacts with the NGOs. Such a continuous interaction is very important. Otherwise a one day PO plenary session serves for nothing.
- The PO allows for interaction of different activists and organizations. It is also an opportunity to call attention for some relevant issues. Because it is led by the Governor, then people can listen. And then, if the Governor is open enough, CSOs can use the opportunity to call his attention to things he is not aware off.
- The PO should be reserved more for a general balance. But its quality depends very much on the preparation. For instance, CSOs have never met among themselves before the PO. So, there are serious problems of coordination among ourselves.
- UCODIN is not fulfilling our initial expectations. When UNOCIN was created we thought that it would be closer to us than to the Government. But it is the opposite.
- The CSOs have no single voice.
- The attitude of the main leaders, particular the Governor, is crucial for the quality of citizen. In this regard the PO contributed to bring CS and Government together. The former Governor in Nampula did act in a pro-active manner. For instance, a NGO can now go to the districts and the administrators receive and respect us. Before it was not possible. It was very difficult.
- But, though, these positive changes depend very much on the good will of the leaders. That is not good enough for sustainability and good confidence.
- CS needs help and support, not just financial support. And the issue is exactly that: what kind of help is likely to strengthen our participation? If you, consultants, could help getting some answers, it would be a great support for the CS.

4.3. International Cooperation Agencies Involved in Past POs

4.3.1. SNV (Netherlands Development Organization)

Meeting with Felisberto Mulhovo, Maputo 22.02.07

- The interviewee works for the SNV, but he is an activist of G20 as well.
- The SNV is focusing on local economic development, tourism, access to markets and local governance. The SNV is now more focused on capacity building and acts more as technical adviser.
- Over the past decade SNV has worked more in Nampula, helping in community consultations, participatory planning and consulting councils at the district level. The SNV representation in Maputo covers the southern region of the country, including Gaza and Inhambane. In the central

part SNV is in Beira, focusing on local economic development and market access. In the northern part, SNV is in Nampula.

- PO is basically a meeting, a gathering where the participants discuss development issues.
- PO serves to legitimize the official discourse on poverty, and in particular, to legitimize the PARPA.
- PO is basically an event, though some of the participants resist acknowledging it just as an event. Those who are directly involved like to see it as a mechanism, if for nothing else because they spend a lot of time on its preparation.
- The quality of the POs depend more on the Government than on the CS. First of all, the Government is interested in showing donors that the instruments seen as relevant to fight poverty are inclusive and involve the CS participation and monitoring. In this sense, those who actively participate in the POs will continue to see them as a mechanism, rather than a single event.
- In practice what do POs foster? Overall, they produce very little and have no relevant impact. POs are informal. They have no legal basis. On the contrary, at least since the year 2005 the consulting councils at the district level are covered by law, the LOLE, the law on local public organs.
- In spite of the fact that local councils are simply consulting bodies, at least they are part of the legal system. In turn, the POs, both at the national and provincial levels, are legitimated bodies because they are led by the Government, but they have no legal basis and are informal.
- At the local level the law demands the administrators should consult the people. Eventually, depending on the districts, they will be able to establish a set of monitoring indicators which should be committing for the participants. The provinces have the provincial plans (PPFD), in which the parties should define their rights and responsibilities. The only problem is that the district has no control over most of the budget.
- As of the year 2006 the district administrators have been allocated around 7 million Meticaís through the state budget. This is a good step towards a real decentralization, though more than 90% of the district budget remains highly centralized either by central or by provincial organs.
- In spite of the weakness of the existing top-down public framework, the pity is that the PO has no such a mechanism. The PO meets once a year, or in some exceptional cases, two times in one year, but the meetings are for superficial talk only.
- After the PO nobody is made accountable for anything. There is no commitment whatsoever. The first PO, in 2003, did try to set a mechanism of accountability. The CS advertised the seven recommendations accepted more or less as a consensus. Then Negrão made sure that such recommendations were highlighted on a written basis at least in the 2004 RAP.
- However, that idea of setting recommendations for later checking has not been followed. You can check any RAP, both in the national editions or in the provincial ones, and no clear methodology of accountability can be found.
- At the provincial level the POs are organized on a very ad hoc basis.
- In some provinces some CS activists started to regard the methodologies recommended by the G20 secretariat as not very useful. In some cases, such as in Inhambane or in Zambezia, there have been some deviations from the recommended methodology. But such experiences receive little attention and support. This was the case of the latest RAP made by the G20's representative from Inhambane and Zambezia.⁵

Final Remarks AF:

- At the end of the meeting Mr. Mulhovo made a very useful suggestion on the CS participation. He thinks CS participation needs to be deconstructed and carefully assessed. As it stands, activists participate in meetings, including those that add no value, because the financing arrangements require some justification on what the organizations are doing. Another reason is that people want to be taken into consideration. If I am invited for a workshop, a seminar or a meeting, I feel pleased and grateful because someone did remember me. But there should be a way for much improvement in what the CS is doing. There should be more mutual responsibility, more transparency and accountability, and more focus upon impacts, real impacts.

⁵ Later on the consultant managed to get the latest RAPs from the G20 representation in Inhambane and in Zambézia.

4.3.2. ADEL – Agência de Desenvolvimento Económico Local

Meeting with Hamid Taybo, Beira 27.02.2007

- The Local Economic Development Agency of Sofala (ADEL) is a non-profit, independent organization with its legal structure, legal personality and functional autonomy recognized by Mozambican law. It is composed and represented by different local entities from the public and private committed to the development of the province.
- The ADEL is in five provinces of Mozambique. It focused on three components: 1) Social services; 2) Resource management, and 3) Local economic development.
- The ADEL has 12 members and started in 2000. Now it provides some credit, in association with the GAPI.
- One of the important roles of the ADEL is to bring different actors together, particularly in places such as the Beira corridor, the national road and other places where different political parties need to cooperate.
- In one region, the Inhangau, which is part of Beira District, we have been trying to recover the natural green area which is the lungs of the city. People cut the trees to burn them. We have managed to bring the different provincial structures, the Beira Municipality and the local community together.
- The ADEL is trying to improve the wood cooking technology for the population, in order to make the usage e of wood more sustainable.
- If there were more effective alternative forms of energy we would not need to use wood.
- In several districts of Sofala we promote the reforestation on a business basis.
- In some cases the institutional conditions do not really help the sustainability. One example is the existing land law. This law speaks on behalf of the people, but everybody knows that it is controlled by the State, and in practice the bureaucrats are the ones who control the land.
- In any case, we try to help the communities to get the share that the land law allows, the 20% profit share from the businesses. But this is not an easy process.
- How do we perceive the PO? Well, a moment in which we interact. But we still feel that the provincial POs are organized to please someone else. Some of CSOs go to the PO to present a report, but what for? The Government and the CS raise questions to one another, but the dialogue is rather weak.
- The 2005 provincial PO could have been good if it had produced an outcome at the end. The CS presented its report. A significant part of the achievements reported in the CS report were drawn from the ADEL's activities. For instance, the report informed that about 56% of our credit support benefited urban areas. This immediately motivated the Governor to question our achievement, because he wanted us to give more financial credit to the rural areas.
- Another example within ADEL's achievements was the cooking oven we developed with the objective to provide more sustainable alternatives for the population. Unfortunately, when we presented our findings, the Governor complained that we take too long to present results and are not doing enough.
- If the very few initiatives and achievements are plaid down and not recognized it may be better to give up.
- The POs should be used to share achievements. If we cannot even walk, how are we going to run fast and fly?
- The PO has no debate. Some representatives of the CS and the Government present their report and, at the end, the Governor closes the session with a speech. That is it. There is no useful debate.
- It is a pity that the POs are not better used for concentration. If we do not move into something more useful, then the plenary will be transformed into a theater.
- We are creating a dangerous culture, a "state of siege" culture full of treading down and intolerance. This is unsustainable. It cannot last for long. Our country needs urgently good examples of coexistence within the differences. We run the danger of becoming one of the most

Box 3.5: ADEL's Advertising Community Activity



intolerant countries in the Southern Africa. Very often the confidence is based on sectarianism, rather than on professionalism.

- Because of this environment the ADEL is trying to promote healthy initiatives, such as what we call the “Environmental Olympics”, a sort of informal competition for the good of our natural and social environment.
- I wished the PO were able to get as motivating and interesting as the FAMA Show managed to be. The person who won the last FAMA Show in Maputo is from Beira. He was so well received at the airport as a hero. Nor even the President was ever received like that winner.

4.3.3. SNV (Netherlands Development Organization) in Beira

Meeting with David A. Korver, Beira 28.02.2007

- The SNV in Beira, as elsewhere in Mozambique, is focusing on consulting, rather than directly implementing projects.
- The SNV in Beira defines water sanitation and local development as its main priorities. In this regard the SNV must align itself with the priorities set up by the Netherlands Embassy.
- In Beira the SNV is giving priority to market access, governance and local development.
- We try to promote the methodology of “problem based learning”, which we try to apply to the Municipality.
- The national CSOs are generally weak. The FOPROSA is one of the most active players in Beira.
- The CS appears to have not yet reached the stage of being able to set up really partnerships. There is lack of capacity and basic professional training and habits.
- The SNV has been asked to support training and capacity building.
- We try to help the technicians to identify the problems, which nonetheless are often leading to the same type of problems. This becomes a vicious cycle, because people have no ability to identify the way forward. In Zimbabwe the SNV could easily find an administrator with an MBA. But here it is virtually impossible. Then, with the lack of basic professional abilities, the SNV is often asked to prepare documents and do secretary work.
- Below the Municipality President it is very difficult to find people prepared to support him. The President of the Municipality has requested our support for training his councilors.
- Unfortunately, the President of the Municipality cannot be photocopied or cloned. The good thing with this President of the Municipality is that he creates a good working environment. He never plays the role of a victim, never complains against the national government. On the contrary, some of his councilors easily move into victimization.
- With regard to the PO, particularly when one considers the districts, it is not clear what will be the role of the PO. The consultation councils are part of the LOLE, but the PO is an ad hoc and informal arrangement. What is the role of POs at the district level? It is not clear.
- We run the risk of pushing, taking the citizen participation to the quagmire.

Final comments AF:

- The SNV is applying the “problem based learning” approach at local municipality, but the participation is far from satisfactory. On the day before the interview the meeting was supposed to have around twenty participants. Half an hour after the starting hour there were only two people.
- On this the consultant called the attention to the fact that the SNV’s approach seems to give more attention to the problem process than to the outcome or outputs. Additionally, if there is no commitment or binding relationships, we run the risk to raise issues or find out problems for problems’ sake.

4.3.4. GTZ-PRODER – Germany Technical Cooperation

Meeting with Jean-Paul Vermeulen, Beira 29.02.2007

- Mr. Nguenha from MICOA took the consultant to meet with the planning adviser from the GTZ-PRODER, one of the international partners that has been supporting preparatory activities for the PO in Beira.
- Mr. Vermeulen commented that in Beira the CSOs are rather weak. Very few can claim that they are standing on the contributions of their own members.
- In a certain way, the NGOs in Mozambique are nothing but consultants who do not pay tax.
- Instead of financing the PARPA donors should move their attention to the local level, for instance the districts. Then, PARPA could become more realistic and relevant.
- For the time being, the PO in Beira does not exist because the person in charge for it finished his contract and returned to Maputo.
- However, the PO could become one of the single most important platforms for debate and political harmonization.
- Organizations like the GTZ-PRODER have no activities outside the Government. The reason is that at the CS level the GTZ could not find any serious NGO. To whom should we address in the CS? It is extremely difficult. This is one of the reasons why it is more convenient for us to deal mainly with the Government.

4.3.5. Swiss Development Cooperation (SDC) in Maputo

Meeting with Telma Loforte & Marc de Tollenaere, Maputo 8.03.2007

Main messages from meeting:

1. Problem of PO is not institutional, solution will not be more institutionalization, but more active role of CS using the space they have already within the PO process.
 2. The consultants' report should not make precise recommendations which way to take; this should come out of a process initiated within CS and not externally imposed. Report should show weaknesses, raise questions and show options and possibilities instead of being too pronounced.
- Consultation or partnership? Initial intention has been partnership, although it has not materialized till now.
 - The reports presented at the PO and the conclusions and agreements coming out of the PO should be made public, published on PO website
 - Problem is that CS is not demanding enough, do not challenge Government. If they feel that rules of the game defined and handled by Government are not favorable for effective and meaningful dialogue, they should refuse these rules and demand for changes, making their own proposals.
 - CS should not accept terms and frame put by Government if it is not serving the dialogue, refuse to participate in meetings which have been called on short notice, without the necessary time for preparation.
 - Influence agenda, not simply react on agenda put by Government.
 - Lack of rigid definition of PO might be an opportunity for CS, an open space they have to conquer and to fill
 - What is needed is not a legal framework for the PO, this is the last important thing. Legal base would not make any difference. More important is a more pro-active attitude from CS, more critical, more demanding and challenging.
 - Outcome of PO and preparatory process (which should be a permanent mechanism, the whole year round) is more important than formal structure and procedure
 - RAP is not meaningful, because it does not relate to PARPA and Government report; is not taken seriously. Is a parallel document without relevance for the process.
 - This year RAP is delayed, which might be a chance in the sense that CS will direct its attention more to the Government report and to assess Government actions instead of presenting their own report
 - CS should take elements from PARPA, according to their priorities, and assess Government performance and make proposals for improvement/compliance.
 - Apply M&E methodology as defined in PARPA. More analytical, result oriented
 - Government will not make any steps towards more accountability if CS is not pressing. Can use leverage of donors in support of their demands, but need define clear agenda, with priorities and proposals.

- Concentrate on a few issues.
- Mechanism should be permanent, probably in form of working groups, which negotiates commitments.
- Can be the same working groups as those preparing the Joint Review (JR). But JR and PO have completely different purposes: although both are on accountability, the JR is negotiating and deciding on the General Budget Support, where CS does not come in. So merging the two processes is not possible and not desirable.
- But JR should pick up results from PO to give CS-proposals more strength. That means that PO should take place before JR, not afterwards. The whole timing should be better coordinated, to have CS debate flow into decision taking process of JR.
- Also parliamentary debate could be fed by CS debate, although this seems politically difficult. Parliament is not open to public debate. CS is not taken into account seriously by Parliament.
- Technical secretariat is the instrument of the Government to prepare PO. This can remain this way. But CS should have its own instrument for better preparation.
- G20 could have this role, but more dynamic, flexible and open. Try to mobilize forces of CS and best capacity within CS. Capacity is there but must be brought to the PO-process.
- Problem of leadership: resources are there but are not mobilized well
- Last preparatory session was positive, participants being very critical and more active
- Also in Joint Review working groups presence of CS is felt more, little steps of progress
- Are financial resources a constraint for CS participation, especially if process is ongoing? Do CSO have resource to dedicate time to systematically work on themes around PO and PARPA?
Answer: If good proposals are made, financing should not be a problem. But some counterpart contribution from CS would be expected.
- Relation local level – national level: Basically the same approach should be taken. Issue on both levels is effectiveness of public spending and accountability of Government for it. There is information collected on local level (e.g. Trocaire is financing collection of data on public performance on some districts) which should be brought to the central level by the PO.
- On district level, role of Consultative Councils is not so much monitoring than planning. But again, don't make it an institutional issue, don't try to create a PO on district level, but work with what is there. Comment KM: This seems a contradictory statement: How can district councils plan without taking into account the performance during the former cycle? Planning is closely linked to M&E, and M&E must be linked to planning.

Final comment KM: Impression that the whole burden of success of PO is put on CS. Emphasizing the role and initiative of CS is o.k. but there can be a supportive or an adverse environment, and the institutional framework is part of the environment. So I would not deny the importance of the institutional framework as radically as the interviewees do.

4.3.8. WB: World Bank in Maputo

Meeting with Rui Benfica and Rafael Saúde, 23.01.2007

- These two WB staff members at the WB office in Maputo expressed their vivid interest in the study and committed themselves to cooperate. They have been met only in January, when Phase 1 of this study began. The discussion was rather general on the planned study, the PO and its appreciation by the WB, without specific conclusions or recommendations.

4.3.6. DFID: UK Department for International Development in Maputo

Meeting with Phil Brown, Maputo 08.03.2007

- PO should be better linked to policy making
- Institutionalization: create legal base with clear TOR (role, tasks, functioning)

- Move from consultation to partnership: mutual agreements, conclusions in form of a sort of contract
- May be concentrated on a few core issues where CS sees priorities and is competent. This seems very feasible on provincial level, less clear on national level, where issues are more abstract, macro-level of policy
- More permanent character in the form of permanent working groups. Again concentrate on a few issues, according to priorities and capacity of CS.
- Instead of report drafted by Government, the resolutions should be negotiated and be published in the form of a joint document, with agreements and indicators, published on the website of the PO. These agreements would be the base in the next PO, where progress is evaluated and new agreements made.
- Technical secretariat should be more independent from Government and steered by both parties (Government and CS) jointly. Process should not be driven by Government, but by both parties with the help of the secretariat as administrative tool. E.g. agenda and schedule should be defined jointly, not Government alone.
- Establish links between PO and Parliament: Some of the conclusions of the PO will be addressed to Government (executive power) in all matters where Government has the competence and authority to agree and comply. Other conclusions of the PO will be addressed to Parliament (legislative power), as proposals to be considered in the areas where Parliament is competent (budget, PES). This could make the parliamentary process more meaningful, with inputs from CS.
- This means that communicative power of CS is channeled to the competent constitutional body, either executive power or legislative power, according to the nature of the issues brought up, which then converts it to administrative power, either by agreements between CS and Government or by decisions of Parliament taking into consideration the proposals from CS.
- That means that CS will have two interlocutors on the side of the State: Executive and legislative.
- Participation of CS in Joint Review should be made more meaningful. CS should define a few priority themes where it can make a substantial contribution and limit its participation to those working groups. Pressure on Government that their role and participation in Joint Review is strengthened.
- Future vision might be even to merge PO with Joint Review: one tripartite accountability process instead of two parallel processes. Aim would be higher effectiveness (especially stronger position of CS as equal partner as donors) and higher efficiency (one process instead of two with the same participants). Government will be hesitant to accept this proposal, therefore present it as long-term vision, but proposing concrete first steps towards given CS a more substantial role in Joint Review.
- Timing of the whole process (including PO, Joint Review, parliamentary debate on PES and budget) should be coordinated much better to relate PO better to the decision making process. Also more time for preparation, not ad hoc meeting announced at short notice, but calendar of process for the whole year, including periodic meetings of working groups (with representatives of all the 3 parties: Government, donors, CS).
- This seems much easier to be realized on provincial level, where process is closer to real problems of people and where CS has a better understanding of needs and possible solutions.
- CS needs to be better organized. G20 should not become an institution (a NGO itself), but a very flexible coordination body, working with all forces of CS who can contribute, looking for know how and capacity according to the themes that are discussed and negotiated. G20 as an open network, where everybody can participate if there is a commitment. I.e. if a CSO wants to participate, they have to commit themselves to do it on a regular basis, to send capable people to the respective working groups and to ensure stability of participation.
- For this, CS might need financial support to have people dedicated more permanently to certain issues and to participate in ongoing dialogue.
- Private sector should have its own voice in PO, not necessarily within G20, to make work of G20 more coherent and give a voice to private sector.
- Integration of informal sector is crucial; difficult to see how this could be achieved

4.3.7. Irish Aid in Maputo

Meeting with Bridget Walker Muiambo, Economic Adviser, Maputo 8.03.2007

- Her main experience is with provincial PO in Niassa, doesn't know national process well, thus the interview centers on the Niassa experience
- Leadership by an umbrella organization with little representativity, G20 is not present in Niassa
- CS representatives heavily outnumbered by Government people
- Role of PO not clear
- Capacity of CS weak
- Process was first meeting of Government with international partners, then with CS, and then all together.
- No feedback from PO to Government policy
- Process is not "rolling", but a one off event without further follow up
- CS is not necessarily weak, but the CS' coordination and organization to mobilize the needed capacity best is weak, lack of leadership and mobilization capacity rather than technical capacity
- Legal base for PO would not bring the solution by itself, but it could have a positive impact on the process
- Idea of merging PO with Joint Review might be a good option, would strengthen CS and streamline the accountability process. The power is in the Joint Review, so bringing in CS to where the power is makes sense. Risk would be that donors overshadow CS, therefore preparation should be made separately by CS and donors and role of donors in plenary meetings should be limited.
- How bring district – province and national level together? Tension between sectorial and territorial arrangements. Priority areas are organized by sectors, not by territories. So bottom up approach would be applicable only for less important themes. Comment KM: However, also sectorial planning can be participative and bottom up, if the instruments are used properly; statistical surveys on district level can be performed in a way that they allow to have the relevant data, which are aggregated at provincial and then at national level. These data then are used as inputs for the national plans.
- Other issues discussed without conclusions: Financial constraints of CS participation? Involvement of informal sector? PO process is absent in the municipalities.

4.3.8. UNDP: United Nations Development Programme in Maputo

Meeting with UNDP (Ondina da Barca Vieira / Els Berghmans), Maputo 9.3.07

- UNDP is of the opinion that PO is not just the event where the participants come together in the annual meeting, but has "a lot" of ongoing activities. Asked to which activities they refer, the answer was: the preparing of the Poverty Report (RAP) by G20 and the activities of the Technical Secretariat, which also was permanently at the disposal of CS if they needed support or information. They also mentioned the revision process leading to PARPA II.
- When asked what relevance the RAP had with regard to PARPA monitoring, the interviewees recognized that it has not much relevance.
- About the role of the PO: They agree that it should be a real partnership, which is not the case at present. On the question, whether the parties are ready for a partnership, their answer was yes, that Government was ready, may be CS not yet because of their weakness.
- We also discussed the issue of the two parallel processes: PO and Joint Review. They think they need to be separate, but had difficulties to spell out the specific role of each one. They argued that the donors would probably not like to have CS too close by during there negotiations with Government.
- They say the procedure is weak and should be strengthened. I asked in which sense. Answer: strengthen the PO-secretariat, strengthen its communication capacity, because CS complains that they don't get the information they need. The consultant argued that this is not in first place a technical problem, but a political one: How much information is Government willing to share with CS. They think that Government is quite open in this respect.
- They mean also strengthening CS' capacity to enable them to assess better the performance of the Government.
- On local level, their understanding is that the Consultative Council should play the role of a kind of PO on district level. They say it has been created for this purpose, to engage CS in planning and

monitoring on local level. The Council's results should then be fed into the provincial PO, having representatives of the districts on the provincial PO (as is the case in Nampula, but not in other provinces, as the consultant was told).

- Legal framework: they are strongly in favor of creating a legal framework for the PO, with definition of role, procedure, periodicity, etc.. They think the law creating the Consultative Council could serve as reference. They say that the Government is working on this.
- To the question on how the dialogue between Government and CS functions at municipal level, they had no answer. They never had thought about the issue, saying that the municipal concerns were probably integrated at provincial POs.
- Another question raised and which was not answered was the integration of the informal sector. They said first this was taken care of by CTA! Then they said that in some provinces the informal sector was represented, depending whether they are organized or not.

4.4. Independent Analysts and Observers

4.4.1. Independent Mozambican Anthropologist

Meeting with Cristiano Matsinhe, Maputo 22.02.07

Preliminary Remarks AF:

- Cristiano Matsinhe is a Mozambican independent researcher and the head of Kula, a research company. He has been selected for the present study as a Mozambican independent researcher, and particularly because of his past experience in working for or with NGOs.
- Based on his personal experience and research, Matsinhe published in 2005 a book entitled *Tábula Rasa: Dinâmica da Resposta Moçambicana ao HIV/SIDA*.
- This book is useful for the present study because it contains information on the onset of NGOs in Mozambique. Matsinhe traces the genesis of NGOs back to 1990, the year of the new constitution, which effectively ended the one party Frelimo regime, gave way to peace talks and established the grounds for the emergence of NGOs and CSOs other than the Democratic Mass Organizations of the government. Matsinhe sees that as the prelude to the disintegration of totalitarian socialism and an approximation to the concepts and notions of the social organizations of liberal societies (Matsinhe, 2005: 42-55).
- Consequently, national NGOs began mushrooming across the nation, which Matsinhe considers between what he calls as "strategies" and "strategisms", the latter being used to refer to worst meaning of the word 'strategy', the sort of ongoing vicious cycle of production of plans, strategies, programmes, with little critical and analytical sense, and regardless of the contextual conditions (Matsinhe, 2005: 21).
- Over the years, NGOs, CSOs and multi- and bilateral donors crisscrossed the country promoting a plethora of schemes and plans of their own making. Matsinhe was interested in the particular case of HIV/AIDS, but his remarks are relevant for other aspects concerning the involvement of CS.
- When many paradigms coexist, and when financing donors are virtually free to choose their allies, benefiting organizations are likely to be less skeptical in their adoption of and adjustment to varying donor agendas. Therefore, the strategies and programmes developed promise to realize an infinite range of interventions, and in most of the programmes "new emphasis is placed on discourses about 'multisectoral approach', 'human rights', 'gender inequalities', 'horizontal coordination' and new terminologies fluctuating in the international developmentalist jargon are successively integrated into the daily agenda (e.g. mainstreaming, empowerment, workshop, scale-up, working-groups, best practices, and so forth" (Matsinhe, 2005: 74).

Main points from the meeting:

- One should pay attention to the motivations behind things such as the PO. One of the main concerns of its organizers is to start their report by saying that "X" number of people or CSOs have been consulted.

- The irony of all this in many cases is that the very people consulted have no competence to comment and give advice on the matters dealt with.
- The promoters of those consulting processes need to report that the whole process was participatory and involved the so-called stakeholders or beneficiaries.
- In the end, we are left with a long developmentalist jargon, which in fact is empty and meaningless.
- Here we start to have a growing gap between all that industry of participation, on the one hand, and the relevant concerns and ideas people do have. People do have ideas, but the problem is that between people and the activities there is a control grill of the discourses.
- The grill is controlled by some of the players and eventually most of those things we discuss in the thousands of seminars become alien to the reality.
- The existing process of consultations is a symbolic process to legitimate policies set up somewhere, either abroad or even in the country. So, what do we mean by sharing? Sharing what and what for?
- Those who start to comment with some competence are more or less hijacked or co-opted by the system. Some are made consultants.
- If the PO were to produce a qualified outcome, then the basis for that needs to be set up earlier before, with good research, high quality debates, systematic analyses, and the like.
- The G20 should have financial resources to promote monitoring, but monitoring rooted on solid grounds, relevant indicators and methodologies. If such things are not warranted, what can we expect as far as performance is concerned?
- The G20 Secretariat should have a plan, a proper plan for discussion of relevant methodologies of work, which needed to be discussed with the G20's constituencies. But who are they? However, the G20 chooses the most complicated road that is to reach a single report, or product, based on consensus which is hard to reach.
- The simplest way would be to promote meaningful dialogues and debates. Anybody such as the G20 which shows so few divergences and conflicting opinions, needs to be suspected. Civil society does not need a resonance box such as the existing G20, which now just helps to keep the status quo.
- Matsinhe recalls his remarks in his book already referred to, on the development jargon, which simply serves to domesticate the people.

4.4.2. Independent Mozambican Sociologist

Meeting with Luís de Brito, Maputo 22.02.07

- Luis de Brito is a Mozambican sociologist and policy analyst, as well as a former country director of EISA, an organization aiming at strengthening electoral processes, good governance, human rights and democratic values through research, capacity building, advocacy and other targeted interventions.
- He has not been directly involved in past POs and on that had little to say.
- Some of his research, particularly his detailed analysis of the provincial and district level multiparty elections.
- Luis de Brito is currently involved with other academics and independent researchers in setting up what is already called a new Institute for Social and Economic Studies (IESE). The group is concerned with the need to improve the quality, focus and dissemination of social and economic research of high academic standards and social relevance for Mozambique and Southern Africa. The IESE is a professional, non-profit organization, scientifically independent, pluralist and interdisciplinary.
- In the brief discussion with de Brito on the specific subject matter of this study, he commented that a PO could eventually become a useful body or mechanism but only if, or when, it starts to rely on the professional and scientific independent work. This remark can be taken as one of the suggestion for the improvement of the PO work and relevance in the future.

4.4.3. Academic and Independent Analysts in Beira

Meeting with Victor Sibanda and Eduardo Elias, Beira 21.02.2007

- Mr. Sibanda teaches Constitutional Law at the Jean Piaget University, a new private but non-profit university, formally opened in the central Mozambican city of Beira, in September 2005.
- He has never been involved in any PO meetings, including in those held in Beira city.
- He was selected for the interview as one of the independent observers to find out whether past POs have been widely open and involving the small academic community existing in Beira.
- Late in December 2006, Sibanda was invited to comment on a controversy provoked by the fact that Mozambican Government is considering to reduce the juridical areas of Beira Municipality. This is one of five, and perhaps the most important, municipalities run by Renamo, rather than by Frelimo, the ruling party.⁶
- Requested to comment on this issue, Sibanda expressed his surprise at the fact that Guebuza's government appears more concerned in fragmenting the administrative arrangement, rather than consolidating and clarifying the responsibilities and tasks of the existing local authorities.
- Returning to this issue during the talk on the PO, Sidanda wondered whether such an issue could ever be included in the agenda of a provincial PO, in order to assess to what extent the change of the administrative setting would help to improve the struggle against poverty.
- The local municipalities should not be diverted from the urgent concerns they are facing. For instance, if the Government concentrates its effort to integrate the local authorities into the SISTAFE,⁷ then that would be doing a good service for the local communities.
- On the contrary, the alleged division of Beira city is likely to foster new economic problems, if for nothing else because at the end of the day that will lead to more public consumption, more expenses with another administration, rather than placing the money in more productive efforts for poverty reduction.
- Whatever the Government does at the local level that raises the size of the administrative sector, civil society will be the one to be left out. These sorts of issues should be taken to POs, but I doubt they are even part of the agenda.
- Mr. Elias was a former deputy at the Parliament and now works as a lawyer and adviser of the Municipality President, Mr. David Simango.
- Like Mr. Sibanda, Mr. Elias has never been involved in the provincial POs, and they doubt that the existing Municipality has ever been invited for the provincial POs, for the simple fact that Beira Municipality is run by Renamo.⁸

4.4.4. CIP: Center for Public Integrity

Centro de Integridade Pública

<http://www.integridadepublica.org.mz/>

The Mozambican Center for Public Integrity (CIP) was set up in the middle of 2005 by Marcelo Mosse, a Mozambican investigative journalism actively involved on issues regarding good governance, transparency and integrity. In this short period, he has been investigating particularly issues on corruption in Mozambique in several sectors: Justice, Education and Health. In 2006 CIP issued statements and analyses particularly on the anti-corruption strategy.

Meeting with Marcelo Mosse, Maputo 02.03.2007

⁶ Ndapona, Edy. 2006. "Divisão do Município da Beira pode gerar confusão", Opinam alguns académicos residentes na Beira. Canal de Moçambique. 2006-12-27, <http://www.canalmoz.com>.

⁷ SISTAFE, Sistema de Administração Financeira do Estado, a Law (law nº 9/2002) which envisages a results or programme-based budgeting system for Mozambique.

⁸ Unfortunately, in short time available for his visit it was not possible to find the list of participation in previous POs to confirm whether the Municipality has been invited to the POs.

- Marcelo Mosse met the consultants one hour before going to the kick off of the Joint Review process. This is the first time he is attending this sort of meetings. In the past he never participated in any PO plenary.
- As far as he understands the Pos, they are aiming to promote dialogue among different stakeholders. The problem, though, is that the so-called CS is weakly and narrowly represented in such dialogues.
- The PO should be a more representative and committed mechanisms. He attended some meetings for the preparation and thinks they were of relatively weak quality.
- This participatory mechanisms involving society can counteract the weaknesses of the Parliament. Parliamentarians report to the party only, not to the people.
- Last November 2006 the CIP has been appointed the CS's representative at the corruption national commission, but at the time of the meeting the National Forum had not yet been set up officially.⁹
- Mosse considers consultative mechanisms for monitoring poverty not good enough as far as social accountability is concerned. As he stressed in the recent Global Integrity's 2006 Country Reports (www.GlobalIntegrity.org) Mosse considers that Mozambique has enough laws and commissions, but the problem is the practice.

5. Preparation of a PO: The case of the 6^o PO in March 2007

5.1. How is the CS involved in the preparation of a PO?

- At the meeting with the PO secretariat, on 25.01.2007, Cristina Matuse and Anifa Ibraimo informed the consultants of the MPD's intention to hold a PO sometime in mid-March.
- On the 15 of February the MPD informed the G20's secretariat, first by phone and on the following day in writing, that the 6^o PO was scheduled for the 16th of March. The letter was signed by the Deputy National Director and invited the CS for three preparatory meeting sessions scheduled for the 22nd and 23rd of February. Initially the place announced was Girasol Hotel, but later on was changed for Avenida Hotel.
- The invitation letter informs that this year the preparatory meetings would be organized according to the three main pillars in PARPA, namely: Governance, Human Capital and Economic Development (this one includes macroeconomics and poverty).
- The preliminary list of invited participants comprised about 60 government officials and 15 international partners, and left it open for the G20 to call any people to attend the sessions. The objective of the preparatory meeting was, according to the invitation letter:

... to discuss, analyze and gather opinions on the activities undertaken during the year of 2006, both by civil society and the international partners, which will then be reported to the PO plenary session, scheduled for the 16th of March 2007.
- Following the above invitation, on the 21st of February the G20 Secretariat published an advertisement at the daily Newspaper, Noticias, inviting the public to participate at the preparatory meetings for the coming PO.
- "These meetings have been called upon by the Ministry of Planning and Development and are organized according to the PARPA main pillars, namely Governance, Human Capital and Economic Development (this one includes macroeconomics and poverty)".

⁹ Presidente Guebuza set up the Nacional Fórum for Corruption, a consulting organ created following the national strategy against corruption. According to the Presidential speech at the launching of the new Forum, its purpose is to promote constructive, open and frank discussions on corruption issues. The independent media, such as the weekly newspapers received this new initiative with scepticism. For instance, Savana's editorial of 16.03.2007 (p. 6), entitled "The wrong formula to fight against corruption" regrets the fact that the new National Forum is led by the Primer Minister, rather than by a well-reputed and independent CS personality.

- The documents for these meetings could be picked up at the G20's office, informed the advertisement. And before closing the advertisement, the G20 secretariat states: Trough these meetings, "the Civil Society resumes the working groups with the objective to influence the Joint Review process". The advertisement does not make clear whether the Joint Review refers to the review taking place between the Government and Donors, to which the CS is now allowed to attend and participate as observer.
- The PO preparatory meeting consisted of three public sessions, held during two days at the Avenida Hotel in Maputo City.
- There is no evidence and information that the G20 secretariat has ever organized any preliminary meeting with its constituents or NGO members. Thus, each CSO or individual participant went to the preparatory meetings at the Hotel Avenida on an individual basis. The first session on the Human Capital had 60 participants. The second session on Governance had 39 participants, and the third and last session had 81 participants.

Main points of the 3^o preparatory meeting for the PO, 23rd February

- As indicated in the agenda for the 3^o PO preparatory session, held on the 23rd February, the focus was on the balance of PES (social-economic plan).
- The Deputy national director for planning, Mr. Abilio Gune, introduced the session saying the Government assumes its responsibility for the economic development and expected the other partners will do the same with regard to their own responsibilities. "We gathered here to speak openly and freely", concluded Mr. Gune.
- The rest of the session was led by a moderator, Mr. Zuber, whose role was basically to lead the debate. He started by requesting all participants to introduce themselves individually (name and work or organization represented). There were about 80 participants.
- Then, the moderator reminded that the PO is not held to evaluate the Government. "This is a partners' forum to assess the performance of the combat to poverty", explains the moderator, and continues "But it is not to evaluate the Government. Nor it is supposed to get into details, but the Government's policy in general and strategies. We then make recommendations to the PO plenary, which is also a consultative forum only."
- A MPD official makes a half hour introduction to the Balance of the 2006 PES. This is a document which has already been presented to the Parliament, which is by the Constitution in charge to assess and approve the yearly PES and Budget.
- Main questions raised by the participants:
 1. *Why is the Government using the inflation rate based on Maputo city only? Does it represent the overall country?*
 (The Moderator called for representatives from INE and Central Bank, but nobody presents at the session to provide an informed explanation. The moderator asked help from the participants. "Any one in the position to give an answer is invited to come forward". One

Box 3.6: G20 Secretariat's Advertisement of the PO Preparatory Meeting on 22nd and 23rd February 2007

NOTÍCIAS 19
21/02/07

G20
Plataforma Nacional da Sociedade Civil moçambicana para participação nos Observatórios da Pobreza/Desenvolvimento

Av. 25 de Setembro, Edifício Time Square, Bloco 2, 1º Andar
Tel: 21355313; Fax: 21355333
MAPUTO - MOÇAMBIQUE

Comunicado

O G20, Plataforma Nacional da Sociedade Civil Moçambicana para participação nos Observatórios da Pobreza/Desenvolvimento, apela às Organizações da Sociedade Civil, moçambicanas e estrangeiras e pessoas singulares interessadas, a participarem, amanhã, quinta-feira, dia 22 e sexta-feira, dia 23 de Fevereiro nas reuniões preparatórias da VI Sessão Plenária do Observatório da Pobreza, no Hotel Avenida, Av. Julius Nyerere, Cidade de Maputo.

Estas reuniões foram convocadas pelo Ministério da Planificação e Desenvolvimento e estão organizadas de acordo com os pilares do PARPA II, nomeadamente, Governação, Capital Humano e Desenvolvimento Económico que inclui Macroeconomia e Pobreza.

A participação de cada um será no grupo/pilar em que quer dar a sua contribuição. Os assuntos transversais serão tratados em todos os pilares.

A agenda destas reuniões é a seguinte:

22 de Fevereiro
8h30 às 12h00 – Capital Humano
14h00 às 17h00 – Governação

23 de Fevereiro
8h30 às 12h00 – Desenvolvimento Económico, Macro Economia e Pobreza

O G20 reitera o apelo à participação de todos. Através destes encontros, a Sociedade Civil relança os Grupos de Trabalho com vista a influenciar o Processo da Revisão Conjunta.

NB: Os documentos para estes encontros estão disponíveis na sede do G20.

O Secretariado Executivo do G20

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participant advanced his own perception of the matter, saying the inflation rate reflects mostly the urban areas and Maputo is the most important urban market. Another one added that the inflation rate might not reflect only Maputo, but includes two other cities: Beira and Nampula).

2. *How many new jobs have been created in 2006?*

(The Moderator called for a representative from the Labor Ministry, but nobody was there and the question was left with no answer. The Moderator suggested looking more carefully in the report in order to see whether it contains any specific information on this particular issue)

3. *What was the Government's target for registering existing and new companies?*

(A representative from the MIC says that the Government had specific target, though it has taken into account the World Bank "Doing Business" information and is trying to introduce improvement. "We want to reduce the time to about 60 days, but for instance in at least one department here in Maputo the process can take just five days". Some of the participants laughed, while shaking their heads with disbelief.

4. *What was the Government's target as far as new jobs and new companies in 2006?*

(Nobody was able to answer to this question)

5. *If the data used in the document distributed are provisional, when will we the final data be made available?*

(Mr. Gune explained some data could not be made ready until the draft was ready for the presentation to the Parliament until the 15th of February, which has already passed. Eventually, the final data will be available, Mr. Gune added, but we have to admit that by then the document will already be approved. The Parliament will not return to the same document again.

6. *What is the Government doing to overcome the problems regarding the indiscriminate logging taking place in Mozambique and all the problems? According to what we read in the media that important sector is completely out of control. So, what is the Government doing?*

(The Moderator called for someone from the Ministry of Agriculture to try an answer. A representative from the MINAG explains the Ministry has planned to do something, particularly in the most problematic areas, but she had no details. She added that last year the MINAG issued a total ban on exporting the most valuable species of tree as unprocessed logs, but she didn't know how it has been implemented. "The rules have been issued", concluded the lady, "but I don't know the extent of their implementation".

The Moderator asked the person who raised the question whether she was happy with the answer, to which she responded negatively. Then, the Moderator asked a representative from customs to comment on fiscalization. The former national director said that Mozambican customs have proposed strong sanctions, and now they just have to be implemented.

Again, the Moderator admitted that the explanation might not be satisfactory, but people should trust on the efforts the Government will certainly make to keep things under control. "The important thing is that the Government is concerned, and will make additional effort".

7. *What is the situation of roads rehabilitation?*

(Nobody was able to answer to this question. But the Moderator added that this question is answered by the text of the Balance, where it is stated that the rehabilitation was done in 200%)

- There were no more queries. The Moderator proposed to have a break for coffee, and then return for the second part of the meeting, which would involve having group discussions for more in-depth analysis of the Balance of 2006 PES.
- The consultant left at this stage and did not attend any working groups.
- So far it is not yet known whether the MPD has prepared a summary from this and the other sessions. Such a summary is expected to be taken to the Plenary session of the 6^o PO.

Main message from a talk with three MPD officials, Maputo 23.02.2007

- The three MPD and MP officials participated, directly or indirectly, in the preparation of the next PO. They have been approached by the Consultant during the coffee break and before the working-groups session.
- On the purpose of the working-groups, particularly after a plenary session which had already run out of queries and even those raised have been badly answered, the Government officials explained the intention of the working-groups was to get a better assessment of the 2006 PES performance.
- Then, the consultant questioned why the Government is interested in involving the CSOs, and eventually the PO, assessing the 2006 PES, when last February such a document was already approved by the Council of Ministers and has also been presented to the Parliament.
- This question took the Government official by surprise, and he openly admitted they had never thought about such an issue.
- One of them then added: "You know how things have been set up. This is to please the donors. They demand that we share the Government's document with the people. They insist on such things called participation, participatory planning. So, what can we do? We please them. Also the Government becomes more relaxed, because nobody can then criticize that we do not share the information with the people".
- After a more cautious consideration the Government officials admitted the standards of these sort of public consultations could be better, but for that several things needed improvement, such as the following:
 - The debates with the CS needed to involve researchers and analysts who study the economic matters on a more systematic basis.
 - The data needed should be made available with time enough to be assessed. But even the data included in the Balance of the 2006 PES were still provisional, which raises many doubts about them. However, since the Balance of the 2006 PES has already passed the Parliament, nobody cares any more.
 - If the PO process is not linked with the Constitutional accountability mechanism, then the whole purpose of the so called assessment becomes questionable.
 - The meaning and seriousness of these debates are questionable when the right people to answer the queries are not present to provide adequate replies. "The right persons that should respond are not in these meetings. Most of those who attend do not know or are not in the position to respond".

The overall process leading to a PO should be improved, but for that an important step is to overcome the ad hoc approach towards it.

5.2. The Joint Review (JR) between the Government and Aid Partners (PAPs)

- The so-called Joint Review between Government and Donors started on the 2nd of March and will go through several systematic and comprehensive stages, during March and April. The closing meeting of the Joint Review is scheduled for the 25th of April, at the Joaquim Chissano Conference Center.
- The reference to the Joint Review at this stage of the PO study is useful and timely for several reasons which should be explored in the final report. For the time being, what is important is to provide the relevant facts and information that allows the reader to compare the work, organization, content and structure of the Joint Review in comparison with the way the PO is prepared.
- Annexes 3 and 4 provide two testimonies on how the PAP (Programme Aid Partnership) is organized, not just through its web page, but also in the way it organizes the overall process of the Joint Review.
- Like in the case of the preparatory meetings for the PO, on the 2nd March the G20 secretariat announced in the newspaper the beginning of the Joint Review and appealed to a wide participation of CSOs in the working groups (see Box 3.7).
- Like in the case of PO preparation, there is no evidence and information that the G20 secretariat has ever organized any preliminary meeting among the G20's constituents or NGO members. The G20 secretariat refers in the advertisement to the existence of more than 400 organizations, but it

is not clear in the writing whether it is claimed that they are part of the G20 or they are simply eligible to become part of it.

- The local consultant has not attended any of the working groups, though according to the information provided by some people who attended, the participation of citizens and NGO's representative is very, very weak.

Box 3.7: G20 Secretariat's Advertisement for the Joint-Review and Appeal for Public Participation in its Working Groups

Comunicado

O G20 é a Plataforma Nacional da Sociedade Civil Moçambicana para participação nos Observatórios da Pobreza/Desenvolvimento. Foi constituída inicialmente por 20 membros, entre Organizações Não Governamentais, Associações, Fundações, Confissões Religiosas, Sindicatos, Sector Privado, Redes de ONG's, ONG's Especializadas, Organizações Técnico - Profissionais e Instituições Académicas e de Investigação. O G20 é hoje um espaço onde mais de 400 organizações se erguem para contribuírem nas políticas e práticas de combate à pobreza.

Os objectivos fundamentais do G20 são:

- Facilitar a participação da Sociedade civil no Observatório da Pobreza;
- Coordenar o processo de elaboração do Relatório Anual da Pobreza;
- Facilitar o engajamento das organizações da Sociedade Civil na análise e debate das políticas de desenvolvimento, principalmente no processo de elaboração do PARPA, bem como na sua implementação, monitoria e avaliação; e
- Contribuir para a capacitação da Sociedade Civil em matérias de advocacia e negociação com os poderes do Estado de modo a permitir que a voz dos mais pobres seja ouvida nos processos de tomada de decisões.

No próximo dia 2 de Março do ano em curso terá início o processo de Revisão Conjunta (RC) entre o Governo de Moçambique (GDM) e seus Parceiros de Apoio Programático (PAPs). Trata-se de uma "avaliação geral da implementação do PARPA, baseada em indicadores do Quadro de Avaliação de Desempenho (QAD) e é também uma avaliação do desempenho dos Parceiros de Apoio Programático usando a matriz de avaliação do desempenho dos parceiros (PAP-QAD)" 1

A avaliação dos PAPs é feita no contexto da Declaração de Paris sobre a Eficácia da Ajuda Externa.

A RC culminará com a assinatura dum Memorando de Entendimento (MdE) que será apresentado na Reunião Final, no dia 25 de Abril do ano corrente, identificando indicadores do QAD que careçam de modificação durante a Revisão Semestral de 2007.

As organizações da Sociedade Civil estão convidadas a participar nos Grupos de Trabalho, à semelhança do que aconteceu aquando da formulação do PARPA II, um exercício que permitiu a inclusão de milhares de moçambicanos neste importante documento.

Neste contexto, o G20 relança o processo dos Grupos de Trabalho de modo a que a Sociedade Civil possa influenciar a Revisão Conjunta, um fórum onde decisões importantes são tomadas em relação à implementação do PARPA.

de Imprensa

Av. 25 de Setembro, Edifício Time Square, Bloco2,
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MAPUTO – MOÇAMBIQUE

A Revisão Conjunta deste ano concentrar-se-á no Quadro de Avaliação do Desempenho indicativo.

Os Grupos de Trabalho estão divididos por pilares ou áreas temáticas cujos pontos focais e as respectivas sedes de reuniões a seguir se indicam:

Pobreza e Macroeconomia
Ponto Focal – Grupo Moçambicano da Dívida
Local das reuniões – Sede do Grupo Moçambicano da Dívida.

Bom Governo
Ponto focal – Centro de Integridade Pública
Local das reuniões – Sede do Centro de Integridade Pública
Desenvolvimento Económico
Ponto focal – União Nacional dos Camponeses, UNAC
Local das reuniões – Sede da Coligação para a Justiça Económica

Capital Humano
Ponto Focal – Movimento de Educação para Todos
Local das reuniões – Sede da FDC

As redes e organizações que se ocupam dos assuntos transversais, nomeadamente, APOSEMO, Fórum Mulher, ABIODES, Sociedade Aberta, ROSA, AIAP e Livramento, poderão apoiar todos os outros nas matérias chave sobre HIV/SIDA, segurança alimentar, meio ambiente, género, vulnerabilidade, desmargem e desenvolvimento agrícola.

O Secretariado Executivo do G20 apela a todos organizações nacionais e estrangeiras e pessoas singulares interessadas a participarem activamente nos Grupos de Trabalho, contribuindo para a avaliação das acções que estão a ser desenvolvidas no combate à pobreza.

Numa primeira fase, os Grupos de Trabalho deverão funcionar plenamente entre os dias 3 e 27 de Março do ano em curso.

De salientar que o Observatório da Pobreza deste ano irá contribuir para a Revisão Conjunta e realizar - se - á no dia 16 de Março com a participação dos pontos focais provinciais do G20.

Vamos todos participar.

Maputo, 28 de Fevereiro de 2007
O Secretariado Executivo do G20

1-Termos de referência da Revisão Conjunta de 2007.

5.3. The Successive Postponements of the PO between the 16th and the 26th of March



- Box 3.8 summarizes and compares the calendar and scheduled activities of both the PO and the Joint Review. On the one hand, the PO was postponed three times: from the 16th to the 21st, from the 21st to the 22nd, and from the 22nd to the 26th of March. On the other hand, the Joint Review follows a well organized and systematic schedule, starting on the 2nd March and expected to close on the 25th April 2007.
- While in some cases no explanation was given to the CSOs for the postponement, during the plenary session of the PO on the 26th March the MPD Minister justified the postponement saying that other agendas more urgent occurred unexpectedly.
- Box 3.8 also shows a major difference between the PO and the Joint Review. While the former is basically a one-off event with a few and superficial preparatory meetings, the Joint Review is a long-term process of detailed and laborious work, lasting about eight weeks.
- With regard to the work content, the reader can compare the briefing of one preparatory meeting, presented above, with the terms of reference of the typical Joint Review process, outlined in the Annex 4. This annex refers to 2006, because the one on the 2007 ToR that is available is in Portuguese. However, in general the content of the current ToR is similar to the 2006 ToR.

5.3. The 6^o Poverty Observatory held on 26th of March 2007 in Maputo

Invitation and Agenda of the 6^o PO

- The formal invitation letter and agenda for the 6^o PO was distributed the week before it took place on the 26th March of 2007.
- The 6^o PO was held at the Cultural Center of Bank of Mozambique, in Matola City, from 9:30 am to around 1:00 pm. The plenary was chaired by the MPD Minister, Mr. Auiba Cuereneia. About 75 people attended the plenary, including a few ministers and deputy ministers, representatives from other public entities, donors and international agencies, the G20 secretariat, several CSOs and a few independent individuals.

Box 3.9: Invitation Letter and Agenda for the 6^o PO, 26th March 2007

<p style="text-align: center;"> REPÚBLICA DE MOÇAMBIQUE MINISTÉRIO DA PLANIFICAÇÃO E DESENVOLVIMENTO GABINETE DO MINISTRO</p> <p>Ofício n° 043/MPD/GM/2007 Assunto: Convite Para a VI Sessão do Observatório da Pobreza</p> <p>1. Por ocasião da realização do VI Observatório da Pobreza, que é um fórum consultivo cuja função primordial é o acompanhamento dos objectivos, metas e acções acometidos aos organismos públicos e privados na luta contra a pobreza, vimos por este meio convidar V. Excia a participar na respectiva Sessão Plenária, que terá lugar no dia 26 de Março de 2007, das 09h00 as 12h30, no Centro Cultural do Banco de Moçambique, Cidade da Matola, cujo programa se apresenta em anexo.</p> <p>2. Agradecemos antecipadamente a presença de V. Excia que será digna do nosso maior apreço. Cordiais Saudações.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Maputo, 14 de Março de 2007  Auiba Cuereneia Ministro da Planificação e Desenvolvimento</p> <p>Exmo Senhor  _____</p> <p>Maputo <small>Av. Ahmed Sékou Touré n° 21 - 6° Andar - C. Postal n° 4057, Tel. 21492268 - Fax: 21492625; 21495463 - Maputo</small></p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>6ª Sessão Plenária do Observatório da Pobreza</u> <u>Programa</u></p> <p><i>Data: 22 de Março de 2007</i> <i>Local: Centro Cultural do Banco de Moçambique</i></p> <p>8:00 – 9:00h <i>Registo dos Participantes.</i></p> <p>9:00 – 9:15h <i>Abertura da 6ª Sessão Plenária do Observatório da Pobreza — Por S. Excia. o Ministro da Planificação e Desenvolvimento</i></p> <p>9:15 – 09:55h <i>Apresentações (MPD):</i> i) <i>Processo da Revisão Conjunta</i> ii) <i>Síntese dos Encontros Preparatórios</i></p> <p>09:55 – 10:35h <i>Intervenção de um Representante da Sociedade Civil; Relatório Anual da Pobreza 2006.</i></p> <p>10:35 – 11:05h <i>Intervalo (30 min.)</i></p> <p>11:05 – 11:25h <i>Intervenção de um Representante dos Parceiros Internacionais (20 min.)</i></p> <p>11:25 – 12:00h <i>Debate</i></p> <p>12:00 – 12:30h <i>Encerramento da 6ª Sessão do Observatório da Pobreza (Conclusões e Recomendações).</i></p>
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The Opening Speech of the PO Chaired by the MPD Minister

- The MPD Minister started his speech by mentioning the tragedy that killed more than one hundred citizens on the 22nd March, when a series of bombs, mines and rounds of ammunition in the country's largest arms depot exploded and descended on nearby poor neighborhoods, triggering fires and causing residents to flee in panic.

- The Minister mentioned the tragedy only, without any reference to its nature. It needs to be said, on the referred tragedy, that there is a widespread public indignation and outcry in the civil society because people believe that this is a tragedy that could have been prevented.
- More than one hundred people were killed and several hundreds injured when shells and shrapnels blew into the air, as the initial blasts caused further detonations, in what can be considered the country's worst man made disaster outside a war zone.¹⁰
- At the timing of closing this report Mozambique's capital Maputo is still mourning its victims.
- After requesting a mininute of silence for the viticms of the tragedy the Minister added that tragedies are satbacks in the combat to poverty. "However", the Minister concluded on this matter, "this should strenghten our self-esteem".
- Then, the Minister described briefly the process leading to the plenary PO is a highly participative process, involving a wide participation from CSOs. He made a few references to some passages from the synthesis of the preparatory meetings .
- A key issue stressed by the Minister is that the Government needs about 71 million US dollars to continue recovering the infra-structures destroyed by natural disaters.
- The agenda indicated the plenary would close by 12:30 pm, but the Minister remarked that certainly many people would like to finish the session before that time, due to several other tasks, including some who would like to join some funeral.

Box 3.10: Tragedy in Maputo on 22nd March 2007



Photo by Alfredo Mueche, in "Domingo" weekly - March 25, 2007.
<http://www.globalvoicesonline.org>

Joint Review, the Synthesis of the PO Preparatory Meetings, and the Donors' Speech

- Then a brief presentation on the Joint Review followed, describing its terms of reference and calendar.
- Then the G20 Secretariat presented the draft of the RAP 2006, focusing on some findings from a public opinion survey. The findings cannot be summarized, both because the draft was not made available and because the presentation was rather unclear and ambiguous.
- A brief presentation of the synthesis of the three preparatory meetings followed, one per pillar of the three pillars of PARPA. The synthesis is general, vague and blurry, with no clear indicators on how, where and when the conclusions and recommendations can be implemented. The synthesis provides a good testimony of the weakness of the overall process of participation.
- Before the coffee break the UNDP representative spoke on behalf of the international partners. He praised the PO as a remarkable, unique, while inclusive and effective participation instrument for monitoring public policies. He expressed his happiness for the fact that the 6^o PO happened while the Joint Review is still in progress, and for this reason the PO can influence positively the Joint Review.
- The UNDP representative highlighted that this PO happens after some provincial POs, and now the POs are held all over the country.

¹⁰ Officials have been blaming the high summer temperatures for the explosions, but citizens are not happy with the explanation and want to elucidate the possible negligence by the military. There is already an independent inquiry committee established to determine the causes of the blasts, and is expected to present the findings in two weeks.

Opening for the Debate

- Following the coffee break the Minister opened the floor for the debate. He began by saying that people should not expect answers. What was important was to have comments and opinions. If somebody wanted to give an answer to any issue, he or she could do it. But for the Chair the objective should be to have a debate only.
- A series of interventions from a whoever wanted to speak followed. About a dozen people intervened. The common feature of the intervention was, as the Chair had requested, simply comments and general considerations.

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7. Annexes

Annex 1. Draft Questionnaire and Methodology for Phase 2 of the Study

Issues to be dealt with in the second phase of the PO study

The following set of twenty questions summarizes the range of issues outlined in the first delivery for the client's consideration. These questions guided the interviews undertaken in Phase 2 of the PO study:

1. Is participation meaningful: right based, integrated in Government structure, with representative and capable stakeholders, with legitimacy? See Eberlei 2006 p. 5ff
2. What are the themes dealt with by CS in the PO? Is CS mainly committed to (soft) social issues and not so much interested in macro-economic and trade issues? How about governance (like public sector reform or decentralization)?
3. How is PO integrated in other planning and monitoring processes (Joint Review with partners, Government annual planning and budgeting process PES)? What is relevance of PO compared to these other processes (negotiation with donors, decisions by Parliament)? How can PO be better integrated in this process to become more relevant and powerful? Timing of events is important (e.g. PES process: involvement of PO should be prior to discussion and approval in Parliament, to allow the voice of CS to be fed in the parliamentary process). How was participation of G20 in the preparation of the last Joint Review (in the thematic Working Groups)?
4. What is role and responsibility of CS in PARPA processes? (Eberlei 20) PO is not legitimated to take decisions, these must be taken by elected bodies (Eberlei 18). Does CS play the role of linking people with elected bodies, voice of the people (communicative power) mainly addressing its concern to the representatives of the people (Parliament – administrative power) who on its turn guides and controls the Government? If we look at it this way, is PO (without parliamentary participation) not a way to undermine the role of the Parliament? CS must establish links with parliament (Eberlei 26f). Then the question is: how should PO is constructed to take into account the constitutional division of power?
5. What is the nature and role of PO? Is it a purely consultative body, a Government mechanism for having CS on board and for seeking their consent and support (propaganda instrument)? Or is at a forum for critical and pro-active CS participation with the possibility of CS to influence development policy with own proposals (not only reacting on Gov. Initiatives)? Is it a partnership analogue to the relationship Gov.-donors?
6. How is relation between external accountability (Gov. to donors) and domestic accountability (Gov. to parliament and CS)? Is there a dilemma, contradiction? Does accountability of Gov. to donors hamper or undermine accountability of Gov. to citizens?
7. How is internal power relation (neo-patrimonial rule, Eberlei 16)? PO overshadowed by or instrumental of power elite (Government, party)? How independent is G20 from Government and from ruling party?
8. Is PO part of the consultative structure created by the Gov. in form of Consultative Councils (Gov. seems to see it this way)? One way street or two way dialogue?
9. If it is purely consultative, is it an effective and efficient mechanism for that purpose? If it is more (like a partnership where agreements are negotiated and enforced), it needs to be institutionalized with clear TOR on roles and power.
10. It seems that expectations on the future role of PO diverge between the stakeholders, particularly Gov. and CS: Gov. Wants to keep it low key, non-committing, while CS wants it to become more powerful and pro-active.
11. Is PO an event, a process, a mechanism, an institution? What activities are going on between the meetings?
12. In which steps of the planning cycle is PO involved: Planning, budgeting, implementation, monitoring, evaluation? Should it be involved in the whole cycle and in all its steps (Processo unico)? What does that mean in practical-technical (capacity, resources) and political-legal (division of power and attributions of Parliament) terms?
13. How representative is G20 for CS? Is it exclusive or inclusive? Possibilities of newcomers to join?
14. How is democratic structure and downward accountability of G20 organizations?
15. Are the "poor" and particularly poor women represented? (Eberlei 22)
16. Can G20 speak with one voice? How is consensus reached? Is G20 a viable platform for expressing CS views and interest? Is it not undermined by other fora where Gov. meets with CS (meetings with CTA, meetings between Employers and Unions on salary increase). Interest and thematic focus of different

participants in G20 seem to differ substantially; what is common denominator that makes it an effective and valid interlocutor for Government? (Eberlei 26)

17. What is role and power of international NGOs in G20 and PO?
18. What is the mechanism of integration of provincial and district POs into the national PO? How does flow of communication work between these levels? How are results of regional/local process fed into the national process? (See Eberlei 21-22)
19. Is the monitoring methodology and indicators used by the different stakeholders the same? What is the basis: PARPA and the strategic matrix? PAF? CS does not seem to work with these instruments (although the matrix has been agreed as reference by all stakeholders). The G20 seems to avoid an open discussion on these issues, just ignoring the methodology and parameters used by Gov (and donors, the PAF) and instead using its own methodology (which is not very clear and has no indicators). Needs to confront different views on methodological issues (it is not a technical, but a highly political issue) and to discuss it, trying to find consensus. Therefore G20 should make a concrete proposal for alternatives, if they do not agree with PAF.
20. What are the products and outcomes of PO, especially in terms of agreements and commitments? More visible are products of different stakeholders (like Poverty Report produced by G20, PES produced by Government). There seems to be a marked difference between the PO (without binding results) and the Joint Review (which produces clear agreements and commitments)

Methodology and draft questionnaire for interviews on the PO

The second phase of the PO study associated with the questions for the interviews listed above, where also structured in the first delivery according to the classification presented below:

1. Institutional issues

- How was process of establishing PO (top down or bottom up)?
- What was original concept, has it been implemented or modified?
- What are the objectives of PO (seen by the stakeholders: Government, donors, CS)?
- Is PO purely consultative or partnership with negotiations and agreements on the basis of mutual accountability?
- Is there structure/mechanism to enable results of dialogue to be translated into decision making process?
- What attributions/powers should the PO have beyond consultation?
- Legal situation: Is PO legally established? Is it integrated in political structure? Are its role and powers clearly defined?
- Is right of information guaranteed? Are civil rights of participants protected?
- What is role of Parliament in PARPA process and its interface with PO?
- What is interface of PO with judicial system and government auditing body (Administrative Court)?
- Structure of PO: Is the system inclusive (allowing latecomers and new actors to join)?
- Role and place of PO secretariat in PO structure
- How is PO structured and operating on provincial and district level?
- How are processes on provincial and district level linked to the national level?

2. Stakeholders (on national and local level)

- Which are the stakeholders in PO? Who are the 60 members of the Opinion Council?
- Are donors members of OC and how do they participate?
- Is G20 representing the whole CS equitably or is it biased with regard to gender, class, geography, etc.?
- Are the “poor” (grass-root organizations) present? Do they participate? If not, who represents them?
- Whom do G20 members represent, who mandated them?
- To whom are they accountable (downward accountability)?
- How are they organized and governed (democratically)?
- How do they communicate with their constituency (information – consultation)?
- How is access to media (press, radio, TV)? Are reports of PO published?
- Are stakeholders (e.g. universities, NGOs working in themes covered by PARPA) not included in G20? Which? Why?
- Question to outsiders: Would you participate if given the possibility? If not, why not?
- Are members of G20 dependent on donors and/or other big players?
- How independent are they from Government and the ruling party? Do G20 members feel that Government tries to appease/neutralize them? Risk of co-optation? Risk of reprisals?
- Capacity of G20 members seen from inside (they themselves) and from outside (other stakeholders and external observers)?
- Has capacity been built up since the creation of the PO? In which areas?
- Have donors financed capacity building in view of PO and empowerment of CS?
- Have stakeholders tried to bring in external know how (academics, consultants)?
- Are there other constraints (e.g. cost) besides capacity on the side of CS?

- What is role of different stakeholders in G20?
 - What interests do they have in common, what are the divergences?
 - How is divergence of interest among stakeholders in G20 dealt with?
 - Are all members of G20 participating actively?
 - Who takes decisions and who speaks in the name of G20?
 - Are some members of G20 dominating and overshadowing others?
 - What are the expectations from different stakeholders in PO?
- 3. Participation of PO in PARPA**
- Is PO sustainable (operating permanently; regular dialogue of no limited duration)?
 - What are its permanent activities?
 - What are the periodic events?
 - Who drives the process? Does PO take initiatives on its own (pro-active) or just react to Government initiatives (re-active)?
 - Is dialogue politically relevant (integrating all key spheres of policy making or limited to certain “soft” themes such as social policy)?
 - Which themes are not or not fully integrated in dialogue and why not?
 - Is PARPA itself limited or is it a fully fledged development strategy?
 - Is dialogue result oriented and how are results (commitments) dealt with?
 - How was the participation of CS in the formulation of PARPA I
 - How was the participation of CS in the formulation of PARPA II (at which stages of the elaboration CS was involved)?
 - Is PO involved in budgeting process?
 - Is PO involved in implementation (policy formulation) of PARPA? How?
 - Has PO access to information on PARPA implementation? What information and how often?
 - Is G20 challenging and criticizing the Government (in meetings or publicly)?
 - Does G20 participate in Joint Review between Government and donors? How (with participation in working groups? With own input?)
 - How is relation of PARPA and PO with other fora and methods of planning and M&E? Relevance of PO compared to other fora?
 - Do other fora (e.g. donor review) compete with or undermine PO (external vs. domestic accountability)?
- 4. Monitoring and evaluation methodology**
- What is the baseline for M&E (PARPA; other)?
 - What is monitored/evaluated: Input? Output? Outcomes? Impact?
 - What are the targets and indicators for M&E?
 - How were they set (agreement among all stakeholders)?
 - What are the measuring instruments?
 - On which data does PO base its M&E? Who does research for data gathering?
 - Does G20 (and its members) conduct political analysis and research or has access to and makes use of such analysis done by others?
 - Which tools are used for M&E and are there other tools available and not used?
 - Why is M&E methodology used by donors not applied by PO?
 - How are the results of provincial/district PO integrated into national level?
 - What were the lessons learned and how have they been incorporated in PO, Government and COs?
 - Are learning mechanisms built in the process? Which?
- 5. Impact of PO**
- Has PO achieved its objectives? Fully, partially, not at all?
 - Has PO influenced the formulation of PARPA II (which are specific inputs from civil society)?
 - Has it influenced the implementation of PARPA?
 - Has it influenced political process (on all levels: central and local Government, Parliament, donors)?
 - Has it influenced government policy and practice on national, provincial and district level? If yes, in which sense?
 - Has it increased transparency and accountability in the allocation and spending of public funds on national, provincial and district level?
 - Has it increased equity and quality of public service provision?
 - What happened to the proposals of G20 in Poverty Report (RAP) 2004? Was there real progress or just declarations of intention from the side of Government?
 - Has PO been the appropriate tool for participatory monitoring of PARPA? Which were the main hindrances for success?
 - Are there alternatives to PO which could serve the purpose better?

Annex 2: Persons interviewed/met for the PO Study

Nº	Date	Acronym in Portuguese	Organization's Name (in English)	Local	Interviwees' name
1	24.01.07	G-20	Secretariat of the Group of CSOs involved in monitoring poverty issues	Maputo	Paulo Cuinica
2	25.01.07	MPD-PO secretariat	Ministry of Planning and Development	Maputo	Cristina Matusse and Anifa Ibraimo
3	15.02.07	FDC	Foundation for Community Development	Maputo	Paula Monjane
4	16.02.07	CTA	Confederation of Mozambican Economic Associations	Maputo	Paulo Fumane/Tim Lafleur
5	16.02.07	ASA	Open Society Association	Maputo	Hermenegildo Mulhovo & Ermínio Nhaguiombe
6	16.02.07	G20-SNV	Netherlands Development Organization	Maputo	Felisberto Mulhovo
7	22.02.07	Researcher	Independent researcher and member of IESE	Maputo	Luís de Brito
8	22.02.07	MF & MPD	Ministry of Finance & Ministry of Planning and Development	Maputo	Alvaro Loveira e Jaime Manjate
9	23.02.07	MICOA	Ministry for the Environmental Coordination	Maputo	José Guambe
10	23.02.07	Researcher	Member of Kula - Independent Research Company	Maputo	Cristiano Matsinhe
11	21.02.07	GMD	Mozambican Debt Group	Maputo	Fernando Menete
12	21.02.07	CCM	Mozambican Christian Council	Nampula	Inocêncio dos Anjos
13	21.02.07	Academic	Lecturer at the Jean Piated Univerty	Beira	Victor Simbanda
14	27.02.07	ADEL	Agência de Desenvolvimento Local	Beira	Hamid Taybo
15	27.02.07	Jurist	Independent jurist work in Beira	Beira	Eduardo Elias
16	28.02.07	SNV-Beira	Netherlands Development Organisation	Beira	David Korver
17	28.02.07	FOPROZA	Provincial Forum of NGOs in Beira	Beira	José Gundana
18	01.03.07	MICOA	Colaborador activo no OP da Beira	Beira	Timóte Nguenha
19	01.03.07	GCTZ-Proged	Rural Development Program	Beira	Jean-Paul Vermeulen
20	02.03.07	Researcher	Director of the Center for Public Integrity	Maputo	Marcelo Mosse
21	02.03.07	AIMO-CTA	Mozambican Industrial Association	Maputo	Kekobab Patel
22	05.03.07	UCODIN	Unit for Integrated Development Coordination in Nampula	Nampula	Felicidade Muiocha
23	05.03.07	DPPF	Provincial Directorate of Planning and Finance	Nampula	Vicente Paulo
24	05.03.07	DPPF/Project	District Finance Expert PPF/UNCDF Programme	Nampula	Ivan Vasqez
25	06.03.07	Okalihana	Okalihana -. Forum of Civil Society in Nampula	Nampula	Ernesto Lopes
26	06.03.07	AMAZ -G20	Water Consumers Association	Nampula	Odete Muchanga
27	08.03.07	SDC	Swiss Development Cooperation	Maputo	Telma Loforte & Marc De Tollenaere
28	08.03.07	Irish Aid	Economic Adviser at the Irish Aid in Maputo	Maputo	Bridget Muiambo
29	08.03.07	DFID	Department for International Development	Maputo	Philip Brow
30	09.03.07	UNDP	United Nations Development Programme	Maputo	Ondina da Barca & Els Berghmans
31	23.01.07	WB	World Bank Office in Maputo	Maputo	Rui Benfica & Rafael Saúde

Annex 3: Web Page of PAP – Programme Aid Partnership

- The purpose of the picture below drawn from the PAP (Programme Aid Partnership) between Mozambican Government and Donors is just to give an idea of the wide range of information that it contains, both produced by the government and donors. The web page contains one link to the PO web page (<http://www.op.gov.mz/>) , which has recently been improved but is still not as rich as the PAP's web page.

	
PAP - PROGRAMME AID PARTNERSHIP	Mozambique
	
http://www.pap.org.mz/gom_reports.htm	
<i>"Harmonising efforts for reducing poverty in Mozambique"</i>	
GOVERNMENT'S REPORTS	
2007	
PLANNING DOCUMENTS	
Economic and Social Plan (PES) - Plano Económico e Social para 2007	
State Budget - Orçamento do Estado (OE) 2007	
Medium Term Fiscal Framework 2007/2009	
2006	
PLANNING DOCUMENTS	MONITORING DOCUMENTS
Economic and Social Plan (PES) - Plano Económico e Social para 2006	Balço do PES
State Budget - Orçamento do Estado (OE) 2006	Budget Execution Report
	General State Account and annual audit reports (available in hard copy)
	Administrative Tribunal Report on General State Account
2005	
PLANNING DOCUMENTS	MONITORING DOCUMENTS
Economic and Social Plan (PES) - Plano Económico e Social para o ano 2005	Balço do PES
State Budget - Orçamento do Estado (OE) 2005	Budget Execution Reports
	General State Account and annual audit reports (available in hard copy)
	Administrative Tribunal Report on General State Account
MEMORANDUM OF UNDESTANDING	LATEST DOCUMENTS

<p><u>Memorandum of Understanding</u></p> <p><u>Annexes</u></p>	
	<p><u>Programme Aid Partners Performance Review 2006</u></p>
<p>REPORTS & ANALYSIS</p>	<p><u>Press Release JR 2007</u></p>
<p><u>Government's reports</u></p> <p><u>Working groups' reports</u></p> <p><u>Other reports</u></p>	<p><u>Terms of Reference for the Joint Review 2007</u></p> <p><u>Plano Económico e Social (PES) 2007</u></p> <p><u>State Budget -Orçamento do Estado (OE) 2007</u></p> <p><u>Balanço do PES 2006</u></p> <p><u>Budget Execution Report 2006</u></p>
<p>PARPA</p>	<p>REVIEWS</p>
<p><u>Action Plan for the Reduction of Absolute Poverty 2006-2009 (PARPA II)</u></p> <p><u>PARPA Matrix</u></p> <p><u>Performance Assessment Framework (PAF) 2007 - 2009</u></p> <p><u>PAF 2006</u></p> <p><u>PAF 2005</u></p> <p><u>Working group</u></p>	<p><u>Mid-Year 2006</u></p> <p><u>Joint Review 2006</u></p> <p><u>Mid-Year 2005</u></p> <p><u>Joint Review 2005</u></p> <p><u>Mid-Year Review 2004</u></p> <p><u>Joint Review 2004</u></p>
<p>PARTNERS</p>	

Annex 4: Programme Aid Partnership Terms of Reference- 2006 Joint Review

Background

1. The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for Programme Aid Partnership (PAP) states that dialogue and monitoring around the PARPA will take place between the Government of Mozambique (GoM) and the Programme Aid Partners (PAPs). It requires a 'Joint Review' (JR) to take place, timed so as to fit in with Government's monitoring, planning and budgeting cycle. The Review will be carried out jointly by the GoM and the PAPs.
2. The JR is a broad review of PARPA (Plano de Acção para a Redução da Pobreza Absoluta) implementation with a focus on the principal Government planning instruments – the PES (Plano Económico e Social), PAF (Performance Assessment Framework) and budget (OE) – and monitoring instruments, i.e. the Balanço do PES (BdPES) and Budget Execution Report (BER). It will also refer to and use the medium-term planning and monitoring instruments (including the PARPA and the Cenário Fiscal de Médio Prazo). The review will make an overall assessment of the implementation of the MoU and make recommendations for improving the partnership.

3. The PARPA II (2006-09) is being developed through a participatory, consultative process involving government, civil society and international partners that included feedback from Provincial Poverty Observatories. A final round of analysis of PARPA II will be done after it is published and not as part of this Joint review. However, this review will focus on the agreement of a new Performance Assessment Framework (PAF) based on the strategic matrix of PARPA II (2007-09).

4. There will be a period of preparation of inputs and discussions (including an integration of the existing sector based review processes and the perspective from provinces and local levels of state administration) at the Working Group (WG) level. The will end with the finalisation of the *Aide Memoire*, on 13 April.

Overall Objectives

5. The overall objective of the Joint Review is to provide joint GoM, and partner's assessment of PARPA implementation

Specific Objectives

6. Assessment of the GoM's performance in 2005 against the PAF indicators.

7. Assessment of PAP's performance, against the PAPs PAF indicators (based on an external evaluation of PAPs performance), in the context of the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and PARPA II draft recommendations.

8. Agreement of an indicative PAF matrix (2007-09) based on the GoM's strategic matrix in PARPA II to be approved in the MYR 2006.

9. Analysis by the Budget working group of the 2006 budget (OE) and PES (2006), with an emphasis on coherence between the two, and the MTEF (CFMP), CGE (2004) and TA Parecer (2004).

Specific Activities

10. According to Annex 4 of the MoU the specific activities to be carried out during the Joint Review are:

- Assess PES, PAF and OE performance for year 2005, based on the PES Implementation Report (Balanço do PES) 2005 and Budget Execution Report 2005, and other available information, taking into account information from sector reviews in the last year (and medium-term evaluations)
- Assess developments in public financial management issues based on the Public Financial Management Assessment Report (PEFA Report) 2002-04 and the plan of action elaborated by GoM.
- Assess the results of the financial audit (2005), the value for money audit (2005).
- Discuss budget plans for 2007 on the basis of CFMP
- Assess performance of PAPs in 2005 against international and MoU commitments. This assessment will be based on an external evaluation of the PAPs Performance Assessment matrix, and will also reflect broader progress towards the Paris Declaration.
- Discuss progress made in the areas of weak performance from the previous Joint Review as identified in the 2005 Aide Mémoire.

11. In addition, the following activities will be carried out:

- Agree an indicative PAF matrix (2007-09) based on the GoM's strategic matrix in PARPA II.
- Analysis of budget (2006), PES (2006), CGE (2004) and TA Parecer (2004). This will be done by the Budget working group.
- Agree lessons learnt on ways of working in 2005 to be implemented in 2006 (overall these have already been highlighted).

Outcomes

12. The outcomes of the JR will be:

- An agreed assessment of GoM performance in PARPA implementation in 2005 (in particular of 2005 Balanço do PES 2005, PAF and State Budget execution) and a brief appraisal of OE and PES 2006.
- An agreed assessment of PAP performance in 2005 against MoU objectives, aid effectiveness commitments and programme implementation.
- An agreed indicative PAF matrix (2007-09).

13. The assessment of the financial implementation of the programme will be done, on the basis of an audit of flow of Programme Aid funds in 2005, other audits and reporting requirements defined in the MoU.

14. The assessment of performance against the PES/PAF will provide the basis for decisions on donor support and commitments of budget support in 2007 (done within 4 weeks following the review), as set out in the MoU.

15. The conclusions of the assessment will be taken forward in the dialogue between GoM and PAPs on the preparation of the CFMP and the PES and OE for 2007.

Outputs

16. The above outcomes will be consolidated into a jointly agreed GoM-PAP 'Aide Mémoire' consisting of a summary of conclusions and recommendations and a main text consisting of different Working Group reports. Groups are expected to produce 2-3 page reports (a format for the structure is explained in Annex 2). The Aide Mémoire will be agreed at final meeting (13 April) after which no more changes to the text will be permitted. The Aide Mémoire should be written in Portuguese and English.

Monitoring and Dialogue Process

17. The review process will coordinate and dialogue with the IMF in the context of the PRGF assessment and JSAN mission in March-April.

Participants

18. The participants in the review will be Government officials at the technical, management and political level, and donor representatives at the technical, management and political level, from the local representations and from headquarters.

19. The Pillars and Working Groups will mainly comprise of GoM, donors and Civil Society representatives, while the overview and conclusion sessions will be attended by management and political representatives from the Review partners (i.e. GoM and donors).

Roles and Responsibilities

20. The Review will involve the following groups:

- **Joint Steering Group:** The Joint Steering group will coordinate the review and bring together inputs into a broad discussion of PARPA performance and plans. The Steering Group is composed of GoM representatives and budget support donors represented by the Troika+ (Sweden, Netherlands, Switzerland, World Bank and European Commission).
- **Joint PAF Coordination Group:** comprising both GoM leaders and donor focal points (not necessarily from the PAPs) at Pillar and Working Group level. The Joint PAF-CoG will have an introductory meeting at the beginning of the JR process and at least once more to discuss and ensure an overview of main inputs from all the groups participating in the JR.
- **Aide Memoire drafting committee:** On the Government, it will include the Pillar Leaders (for an overall vision and approval) and a technician from MPD for each Pillar (for detailed drafting work). The donor representatives will include Troika economists, PAP Secretariat, donor Pillar leaders and one HoC who will steer the strategic contents of the document. The drafting team will produce a first draft of the Aide Memoire in Portuguese. The drafting team will endeavour to respect the working hours.
- **Budget working group:** comprising of the representatives of DNT (National Directorate of Treasury), DNCP (National Directorate of Public Audit) and DNO (National Directorate of Budget) and donor representatives. The BWG will analyze the following documents:
 - Audit of the State Accounts/ Parecer of TA 2004, Budget and PES 2006 (the BWG will prepare a note to facilitate the discussion)
 - Quarterly Budget Execution Report 2005, MTEF (the BWG will prepare a note to facilitate the discussion based on inputs from working groups)
- **Pillars:** Will assure an overview in each area of the Review, drawing the links within each Pillar. Will report to the Joint Steering Committee on the overall findings and recommendations of the Pillars on a regular basis. There will be 4 Pillars, each with co-leaders (including GoM and PAP representatives) as follows:
 - a. Macro economy and Poverty
 - b. Governance
 - c. Economic Development
 - d. Human Capital
- **Working Groups:** The same structure of the working groups that were involved in the preparation of PARPA II will be used. They consist of a limited number of GoM, PAP officials and civil society representatives, and will have a Chair from GoM and a counter-part focal point from PAPs. Working Groups report on a regular basis to their respective Pillars. The inputs and report from the working groups should follow the general guidelines presented in Annex 2.

All pillars and working groups will include in their assessments the key cross cutting issues: HIV/AIDS, gender and environment. Most GoM ministries have staff working on HIV/AIDS, Gender and Environment. It is recommended that they are included in the working groups. Moreover, there also exists cross cutting groups dedicated to HIV/AIDS, Gender and Environment. These cross cutting working groups can provide guidance and support to the pillars and working groups as necessary, to ensure that crossing cutting issues are reflected within individual pillars and groups. Individual reports could also be submitted by the crossing cutting groups.

The JR 2006 will continue the process of gradual integration of **province/district perspective** in the analysis of GoM performance, as proposed in Annex 3.

Key Reference documents

- PES 2005 Implementation report (Balanço do PES)
- Budget Execution Report 2005
- PAF 2005
- 2005 JR *Aide Memoire*
- 2005 MR *Aide Memoire*
- Individual working group reports
- MTEF (CFMP) 2006-09
- Public Financial Management Assessment Report (2005) known as the PEFA report
- Independent external assessment of donors performance to improve aid effectiveness
- Audit of the State Accounts 2004 (Relatório da Conta Geral do Estado 2004)
- Parecer do Tribunal Administrativo 2004
- Budget 2006
- PES 2006
- PARPA II

Abbreviations

BdPES: Balanço do PES
BER: Budget Execution Report
CCGs: cross-cutting groups
CFMP: Cenário Fiscal de Médio Prazo
DPG: Development Partners Group
CS: Civil Society
GoM: Government of Mozambique
HoCs: Heads of Cooperation
HoMs: Heads of Mission
JSA: Joint Staff Assessment
JSC: Joint Steering Committee (GoM-PAP)
IMF: International Monetary Fund
MPF: Ministry of Planning and Finance
MoU: Memorandum of Understanding
MYR: Mid-Year Review
MTEF: Medium Term Fiscal Framework
OE: Orçamento do Estado (State Budget)
PAF: Performance Assessment Framework
PAF CoG: PAF Coordination Group
PAP: Programme Aid Partnership
PARPA: Plano de Acção para a Redução da Pobreza Absoluta (Action Plan for Reduction of Absolute Poverty)
PES: Plano Económico e Social (Economic and Social Plan)
PRGF: Poverty Reduction Growth Facility
PRSC: Poverty Reduction Support Credit
QBER: Quarterly Budget Execution Report
RWGs: Reform working groups
SWG: Sector Working Groups
JR: Joint Review

Annexes:

Annex 1: Timetable for JR preparation
 Annex 2: Guidelines for the working groups (provisional)
 Annex 3: Province/District perspective in JR 2005
 Annex 4: List of participants and working groups

Annex 1: Timetable for JR preparation

Annex 2: Guidelines for working groups

STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT (THE FULL REPORT IN PORTUGUESE AND ENGLISH IS DUE ON 31 MARCH)

Format for WGs comments on the budget execution report 2005

- **Reference Documents:**
 - Third semester report on budget execution 2005 (Jan-Dec).
 - Relevant section from Balanço do PES 2005 on budget policy.
- **Length of comments:** Max 1 page
- **Deadline:** 13 March 2006
- **Language:** Portuguese
- **Suggestion of points to include:**
 - General evaluation of the information contained in the documents: whether they are relevant, coherent, complete, transparent, correct, etc.
 - Evaluation of budget execution in 2005: timely availability of funds, level of execution (sectoral, investment, goods and services, etc.), trends, conformity with sector priorities.

- Questions for clarification: errors, doubts, missing information
- Any other suggestions and comments

Annex 3: Province/District perspective for Joint Review 2006

The working groups are strongly encouraged to bring in a local perspective in their reviews. Where possible, this can be undertaken jointly with other working groups or can be based on recently concluded events (trips, information gathered, etc.). Below is an example of terms of reference for a provincial visit by the EWG.

EXAMPLE: Terms of Reference

Introduction

After the Mid Year Review in 2004 it was agreed that the Joint Review/Mid Year Review process, which reviews PARPA implementation, should progressively seek to integrate a wider range of opinions, particularly those from provincial and local levels of the state administration. Joint missions to the provinces were one of the mechanisms chosen to facilitate this integration. In 2005 the provincial visits covered the Northern provinces of Nampula and Niassa.

In 2006 two joint visits to Manica and Cabo Delgado provinces will be made before the Joint Review.

Objective

The main objective is to discuss aspects of decentralization and public financial management and how these affect the service delivery at provincial, district and local level in the sectors of health and education. An important aspect will be the capacities at different levels to plan, implement and monitor the reforms. The discussions will feed into the Joint Review process and further integrate a provincial and local perspective into PARPA implementation and monitoring. The visits are also an opportunity to identify critical aspects for harmonization and alignment. At the end of the visit, participants will have a provincial and local view of the challenges ahead regarding PARPA implementation in the decentralization, public financial management area and service delivery.

Main topics for discussion

1. **PARPA II** - Involvement of the province and districts in the process, links to provincial and district plans, experiences of provincial poverty observatories, future implementation and monitoring at provincial, district and local level,
2. **Decentralization and its implementation at provincial and district level** - Recent advances, planning process at provincial and district level and links to local levels, functioning of IPCC mechanism (both participation and accountability/responsiveness), districts as budget units, district development plans, bottlenecks in implementation; capacity of district and provinces.
3. **The budget cycle and roll-out of e-SISTAFE** - Preparedness and capacity for roll-out, planning and resource allocation (centre/province/district/local), inclusion of sectoral budgets in territorial plans and budgets, implications of the 7 bln MTS for provincial sectoral budgets; bottlenecks in flow of resources, budget execution, on/off budget financing and different aid modalities used.

Participants

The ideal would be that the group would not be too big (maximum 8-9 persons) in order to allow for informal meetings. Participants could include PAP economists, health, education and decentralisation specialists (GoM and donor representatives) and participants from central government (MPD/MF).

Time for visit

In the context of the JR the Health Sector will undertake visits to three Provinces. The timing of the joint visits will be coordinated with the health sector provincial visits in cases where the provinces are the same. The joint visits should be carried out before 15 March

Proposed dates:

Manica: 13-15 March

Cabo Delgado: 13-15 March

Tentative program

- Meetings with the Provincial Permanent Secretary, the Provincial Directors of Finance, Planning and Budget and with the Provincial Directors of Education and Health
- Meeting with civil society organisations

- Meeting with World Bank decentralisation project
- Field visit to one or two districts and meet the district administrator and district directors of finance, education and health
- Possibly visit school or hospital.

Organisational issues

In order to comply with the objective above, it is proposed to consider the following:

- Discussion and agreement with government on possible ways for having local government representation in the JR process
- All working groups participating in the JR process consider integration of the topics above in their sectorial review processes.

ANNEX 4: LIST OF PILLARS/WORKING GROUPS and FOCAL PERSONS